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Abstract 
This treatise covers the history, now more than 170 years long, of researches and 
debates concerning the biblical city of Ai. This archetypical chapter in the evolution 
of biblical archaeology and historiography was never presented in full. I use the 
historical data as a case study to explore a number of epistemological issues, such as 
the creation and revision of scientific knowledge, the formation and change of 
consensus, the Kuhnian model of paradigm shift, several models of discrimination 
between hypotheses about the past, the interplay between scientists' values and 
their epistemic beliefs, and the truth-bearing of historiographic reconstruction. I 
show, in particular, that when scientists share common epistemic values they can 
modify their beliefs even when such changes go against deeply entrenched biases 
and preconceptions. Considerations of coherence usually constrain such 
modifications, and when sufficient data is available the result can be a profound 
change of beliefs. Several episodes of the "Ai debates" demonstrate, however, that 
similar change of beliefs will not occur when non-epistemic values take precedence.  
 
Introduction 
In the early 1930s, a young and inexperienced archaeologist named Judith Krause 
astounded her colleagues when she announced that her excavations at a mound 
named Et-Tell, generally believed to be the location of the Biblical Ai, showed that 
the site was inhabited only during the Early Bronze Age and the Iron Age. Besides 
contradicting prior results of leading experts, this outcome implied that the story of 
the conquest of Ai, detailed in chapters 7 and 8 of the Book of Joshua, is legendary 
and lacks any historical substance.  
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The announcement drew immediate and widespread responses from scholars in the 
relevant disciplines. As a short examination of their publications can quickly reveal, 
at stake was more than scientific theories and personal reputations: Most of the 
archaeologists who worked in Palestine at the time were graduates of Christian 
denominational institutions, many of them ordained priests. The minority, including 
the young excavator herself, were Jewish and Zionists, who regarded the biblical 
narratives as cherished national lore. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 
expressions such as "disturbing," "perplexing," "deep embarrassment," and the like 
were repeatedly heard for more than forty years after the appearance of the 
excavation report.  
Something that was not heard, however, was reservations about the archaeological 
and chronological determinations. Despite the researcher's young age and lowly 
status and notwithstanding the disruptive and subversive character of her 
conclusions, all considered them as veridical. Scholars who found the results 
disturbing offered all sorts of explanatory hypotheses to reconcile them with their 
general historiographic views, essentially modifying the latter.   
I think that this acceptance, by itself, calls for an explanation. According to some 
current theories in the sociology and the philosophy of science, scientists' 
background, beliefs, and Weltanschauung play a decisive role in shaping their 
inferences. Archaeology, in particular, is known to be a strongly theory-laden 
discipline. What was it that made Marquet-Krause's1 conclusions so definitely 
acceptable to the scholars of her time and beyond?  
A large part of this work revolves around this question.  In this context, I discuss the 
nature of archaeological knowledge (with particular attention to ceramic typology 
which was instrumental in the chronological determination mentioned above), the 
risk of circularity and its possible mitigation through independence of evidence, and 
the interplay between scientists' values and their epistemic beliefs. The history of 
"the Ai conundrum" perfectly illustrates Tucker's (2004: 42) observation that as long 
as scientists' epistemic values are hierarchically superior to their other values, 
                                                           
1 She married the orientalist Yves Marquet in 1934.  
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empirical evidence can induce modifications of scientific opinions. A counterexample 
is also available in the form of latter-day attempts to salvage the biblical Ai story 
through a substantial revision of the current consensus. 
The lengthy and rich history enables me to illuminate a few topics in epistemology. I 
discuss the adequacy of the Kuhnian paradigm-shift concept for the changes that 
occurred in the scientific opinions about the biblical Ai story, the relative merits of 
several conceptual frameworks for the discrimination between historiographical 
hypothesis, the crucial role of coherence considerations in the shaping of an 
epistemic stance, the validity of inference from absence in archaeology, and the 
interplay between scientists' values and their epistemic stance. In a final section, I 
defend the idea that such cases of surprising, complicated and yet resilient 
discoveries about the distant past demonstrate the power of scientific research to 
discover mind-independent truths.  
Inspired by Chang's (2004) "The invention of temperature," this treatise is divided 
into two parts. The first one is historiographic: It describes the sequence of historical 
episodes, from the early attempts to identify the location of the biblical Ai in the 
1830s to recent articles that reopened this subject in the 21st century. I attempted to 
strike a balance between the need to provide the pertinent information and the wish 
to limit the size of an anyway lengthy essay. Background subjects which are 
pertinent to the discussion but are not directly related to Et-Tell and Ai, such as the 
evolution of ceramic typology in 19th-century Palestine and the date-of the-Exodus 
debate, are described in three "interludes" and one "digression" which are 
interspersed between the chronological sections.2 
The second division begins with a concise summary of the history and goes on to 
discuss the epistemological issues mentioned above.  The sections in this part are 
interrelated, but I tried to make each one self-standing. Internal cross-references are 
provided in the text.  
                                                           
2  For a broader presentation of the history of biblical archaeology see Moorey 1991; Finkelstein and 
Silberman 2002; Dever 2003; Davis 2004.  
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The concluding section of this chapter restates its rationale and adds some general 
comments.  
Division A: The history of a site and a legend 
"Ai is simply an embarrassment to every view of the conquest that takes the biblical 
and archeological evidence seriously."  
Callaway 1968 
The Bible mentions Ai several times: as a place (Gen. 12:8, 13:3), east of Bethel, near 
which Abraham built an altar and sacrificed to God; as a fortified Canaanite city 
(Josh. 7,8), whose conquest by Joshua and the Israelite is described in vivid details; 
and as a city to which te Israelites returned (Ez. 2:28, Neh. 7:32, 11:31) in the post-
exilic period.3 The geographical, archaeological, and historical correlates of Ai have 
been the subjects of intense interest and scholarly debates for nearly two centuries.  
This division presents the research activities and opinions related to Ai in modern 
times. It follows a chronological order, with some deviations from the strict timeline 
where I thought that grouping things by a topic would make the exposition clearer.   
1. Where is Ai? Travelers with the Bible in hand, 1838-1900 
The first to search for the location of Ai in modern times was the American Edward 
Robinson. Armed with a consummate knowledge of the Bible and other classical 
sources, and accompanied by Eli Smith, a Beirut-based missionary and translator of 
the Bible to Arabic, the professor from the Andover Theological Seminary traveled 
through Ottoman-ruled Palestine in 1838 (and again in 1852), with the express 
intention of locating biblical sites. Toward the opinions of past pilgrims (and Catholic 
traditions in general) on these matters he held nothing but contempt. His 
conclusions were derived from juxtaposing local geography and place-names with 
what he considered to be reliable texts.  These included the Bible, of course, but also 
                                                           
3 Some scholars, but not all, interpreted Isa. 10:28 mention of "Aiyath" and I Chr. 7:28 "Aiyah" as 
referring to Ai.  
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early geographical treatises such as  Eusebius' Onomasticon and Jerome's De situ et 
nominibus locorum Hebraeorum, both from the fourth century A.D. 
The latter sources indicate that Bethel should be "about twelve (Roman) miles from 
Alia (Jerusalem)" and "on the right of the road leading to Neapolis (Shechem)." 
Estimating the distances by horse ride and noting that "the Arab termination în for 
the Hebrew el is not an unusual change," Robinson concluded that "There is little 
room for question that both the name and the site of Beitin are identical with those 
of ancient Bethel" (Robinson 1856:127).  It was more than a hundred and thirty years 
before someone (A12) disagreed with this conclusion.   
But where was Ai? Here Eusebius and Jerome offered little help, saying only that it is 
"a small heap of stone" somewhere near Bethel. Gen. 12 specifies that it should be 
east of Bethel. Contemplating the account of battle in Josh. 8:17,4  Robinson 
observed that these two cities 
were not so far distant from each other, but that the men of Bethel mingled 
in the pursuit of the Israelites, as they feigned to fly before the king of AI, … 
yet they were not so near, but that Joshua could place an ambush on the 
West (or  Southwest) of Ai, without its being observed by the men of Bethel. 
(313)  
Armed with these observations, Robinson attempted twice to locate the remains of 
ancient Ai. He was able to identify two suitable alternatives: "A site with ruins South 
of Dîer Dîwân; or upon a rocky Tell (hill) … overlooking a deep northern valley" (119; 
cf. also the maps in Figs. 1 & 2). In his second tour of the area, he decided that the 
latter would not do because "We expected to find here some remains of an ancient 
city, but there was nothing save a cistern and an immense heap of unwrought 
stones." For a similar reason, he rejected some other (unnamed) alternative in the 
vicinity and concluded, somewhat hesitantly, that "After all our search, we could 
come to no better result than to assign as the probable site of Ai with ruins just 
south of Dîer Dîwân… having near by [sic]… another smaller Wady, in which the 
                                                           
4  "And there was not a man left in Ai or Bethel, that went not out after Israel…"  
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ambuscade of the Israelites might easily have been concealed." He did not name this 
"site with ruins," however, and that caused some misunderstandings later.   
Over the following half-century, various scholars-travelers attempted to locate the 
site of Ai with greater certainty. Like Robinson, all applied the logic of juxtaposing 
the ancient texts with local geography, topography, and extant toponyms. Shared by 
all was a firm belief in the literal veracity of the biblical account. This led them to 
look for valleys that could hide a force of five thousand men (tacitly disregarding 
Josh. 8:4 which speaks of 30,000), the "Shevarim" of Josh 7:4, the heap of stones 
that was piled over the body of the king of Ai, the hill between Bethel and Ai upon 
which Abraham placed his altar or the remains of Jeroboam's idolatrous temple.  
This methodology, it turned out, produce a handful of Ai-alternatives (Fig 2): The 
Dutchman Charles William Meredith van de Velde (1854: 279) rejected Robinson's 
(still unnamed) preferred choice for being on the South-Southeast, rather than 
strictly East, of Bethel. Following a suggestion by the British Consul James Finn, he 
opted for Robinson's first alternative: The cistern there was, for him, a sufficient 
evidence of an ancient city.  He was also impressed by the resemblance between the 
site's name (he reported that the locals call it Tell-el-Hajar – "the mound of stones") 
and the language in Josh. 8:28 "So Joshua burned Ai and made it a permanent heap 
of ruins, a desolate place to this day."  
The establishment of the British Palestine Exploration Fund in 1865 led to a renewed 
interest in the Biblical geography of Palestine. Charles Wilson's article, "On the site of 
Ai and the position of the altar which Abraham built between Bethel and Ai", 
appeared in the first volume of the Fund's Quarterly Statement (Wilson 1869). It 
summarizes several days of fieldwork that "consisted in personally visiting every hill-
top and almost every acre," but first set out to clarify a question of toponymy: Van 
de Welde's "Tell el Hajar" also bears the name "Et-Tell." From a certain Reverend 
Williams, Wilson learned that Josh. 8:28, when consulted in the Hebrew origin, 
actually uses the words "tell olam" to describe the state in which Joshua left Ai. And 
if this was not enough to clinch the identification, "the topography of Ai is as 
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minutely described as that of any place in the Bible… These features are all found in 
connection with Et-Tell, and with no other place in the neighborhood of Bethel."  
Not everybody concurred. The French explorer Victor Guérin published in the same 
year a detailed report on his journeys in Judea (Guérin 1869). After discussing 
several alternatives in the vicinity of Beitin / Bethel, he rejected Van de Welde's 
suggestion since "le Khirbet Tell el-Hadjar n'offres le ruines d'une-ville veritable : ce 
sont les restes d'un  simple village" which would not accommodate even a tenth of 
the presumed population of ancient Ai. For the same reason he disapproved of 
Khirbet Hyeh (Hayian?), which was suggested by a certain Dr. Kraft. Khirbet El-
Khudrya, on the other hand, "presente tous les characters d'une cite antique rasse." 
This site, he believed, was also Robinson's choice.5   
The next round of Ai searches came with the Survey of Western Palestine, conducted 
under the auspices of the Palestine Exploration Fund by officers of the Roya 
Engineers Corps. In his report for the year 1873, Charles Conder (1874) sided with 
Wilson, both about the true name of Et-Tell/El-Hajar (which he checked "with a 
dozen separate witnesses") and its perfect conformity, topographically speaking, to 
the details in Josh. 7-8.  
Yet later, Conder changed his mind. In his book "Tent work in Palestine – a record of 
discovery and adventure" (1887), as well as in his summary report to the Palestine 
Exploration Fund (1881), he rejected Et-Tell both for the old argument that it "does 
not show traces of having at any time been covered by buildings" (Conder 1887: 109) 
and also for being "too close to the pass, it has moreover no valley fitting for an 
ambush to the west of it." Khirbet Haiyan (which Guérin summarily rejected) seemed 
to him now an ideal choice: It is two miles to the west of Bethel and "between the 
two sites is the open ravine …where unseen, yet close at hand, the ambush may 
have Iain concealed" (1881:37). Additional support for this suggestion he derived 
                                                           
5 In this he was probably wrong, because Robinson's reference to the "site with ruins" seems to be 
somewhere in the southwest of Beitin, while Kh. Khudrya lies to the southeast of it. In fact, Albright 
(1924:141) surmised that Guérin mistook Kh. Haiyan for Kh. Khudrya. 
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from Josephus, citing the Greek version of Josephus'  Kadmoniot which uses the 
name Aina for Ai.  
Horatio Kitchener, Conder's junior partner to the Survey of Western Palestine (and of 
later Khartoum and WWI fame), offered yet one more Ai-alternative: A site named 
Khirbet el-Hai "one mile east of Mukhamas."  The topography of the place, he 
argued, fits even better the description in Josh. 8. That the site is rather far from 
Bethel might be, he conjectured, an argument in its favor. It would explain why the 
Israelites, having sacked Ai, did not proceed right away to conquer Bethel (The 
conquest of Bethel is reported in Jud. 1 as having taken place after Joshua's death).  
To sum up: The efforts of about a dozen scholars-explorers during the nineteenth 
century produced four alternatives for the site of ancient Ai: Et-Tell/Tell el-Hajar, 
Khirbet Khudrya, Khirbet Haiyan and Khirbet el- Hai.6 Arguments for each suggestion 
relied mainly on biblical geography and topography and to a lesser degree on 
toponymy and biblical language.  
2. Interlude: Flinders Petrie and the birth of Palestinian (aka biblical) 
archaeology7 
In 1890 Flinders Petrie, who had already gained a reputation in Egyptian 
archaeology, came to excavate in Palestine on the invitation of the Palestine 
Exploration Fund. Assuming (erroneously) that a mound named Tell el-Hesi was the 
site of the biblical Lachish, he and this assistant Frederic Jones Bliss excavated there 
in 1890, 1891 and 1892. Petrie was arguably the first to realize that such a mound 
consists of the successive vertical accumulation of living settlements, thus pioneering 
                                                           
6  There is considerable variation in the transliteration of the names. Henceforth, I will use the 
versions common to most of the later publications.  
7 Sections A2 (here), A5 and A7 discuss inferential strategies used by  Flinders Petrie, William Foxwell 
Albright and Judith Marquet-Krause, respectively, for estimating the age of sites and artifacts.  These 
brief interludes focus on aspects that were relevant for the chronological determination of t-Tell and 
especially the diachronic evolution of the relevant capabilities.  As such, they should be understood as 
partial "snapshots" from the history of archaeological typology.  For comprehensive discussions of the 
methodology and philosophical aspects of archaeological typology see, e.g., Shepard (1956), Adams & 
Adams (1991), Wylie (2002, especially Ch. 2), Trigger (2006), and Chapman & Wylie (2016).    
9  
 
Middle-Eastern stratigraphy. The problem was how to determine the chronology of 
the site and the layers therein:  
The first difficulty that we meet is that are no coins and no inscriptions to 
serve to date any of the levels. How then can we read history in a place 
where there is not a single written document? How can we settle here what 
the date of anything is, if not a single date or name remains? (Petrie 1892: 5). 
Petrie's strategy had four elements, three of them implicit and the fourth and crucial 
one implicit:8 
 Looking for systematic and gradual chronological evolution in form, production 
technique, and style. This is the basic background assumption of typology, which 
Petrie perfected, using the methodology of seriation, during his work with 
artifacts from prehistoric tombs in Egypt, applied here in a different context: 
We could recognize without doubt also the three great divisions: (1) 
the massive walls below (2) the deserted and barbarous state of the 
site (3) and the thinner walls above with very different pottery. (8) 
 Making some gross local assumptions:   
When I came to compare these dates with the range of pottery in the 
tell, it indicated that the accumulations were about five feet in a 
century … We are led to put the earliest foundation of the place to 
the beginning of the seventeenth century B.C. (7) 
 Using previously dated artifacts from other countries to chronologically 
"anchor" the series of artifacts:  
But how are we to proceed in where we know nothing as yet of the 
age of its products? It is like an inscription in an unknown language: … 
We have to wait for a bilingual tablet…. In the same way, we must 
wait till we find objects from other countries of known age, 
intermixed with those as yet unclassified.  
                                                           
8 Sir William Matthew Flinders Petrie was a prolific writer. The fullest exposition of his methodology 
and philosophy can be found in "The aim and methods of archaeology" (1904) and "Seventy years in 
archaeology" (1932).  I prefer to cite from his 1892 monograph because it is directly pertinent to my 
topic. See also the previous footnote about my aims and scope here.  
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  Both existing and missing artifacts served as chronological "anchors": 
I found nothing as late as Alexander … Hence it is certain that we must 
place the whole history of the Tell before the fourth century B.C.  
A jar handle stamped with "The Palace of Ra-aa-x`heperu," namely, 
Amenhotep II, takes us back to the middle of the fifteenth century. (9)  
 Using a historiographic framework for interpretation of the material remains, 
usually (in the case of Palestine) based on biblical texts: 
[The divisions above] correspond to the Amorite Age, The Judges, and 
the Jewish monarchy. (8) 
Thus there is a total of probably just under 40 years from the Exodus 
to the last Egyptian raid on Palestine… Tell el Hesy – the Lachish of the 
Amorites – was therefore capable of but little defence when the 
Israelites fell on it.  (16) 
The outcome of Petrie's work was twofold: A historiographic framework (the "Ages" 
mentioned above) and a typology – a classificatory system for Palestinian pottery 
that was expanded and published by his pupil, Frederick Bliss. The two (as he 
maintained several times in the short essay cited above) support each other because 
they cohere ("agree well") mutually and with other discoveries from the ancient 
Levant. 
Petrie considered the typology his more significant achievement:  "If I do nothing 
else, I shall at least have established a scale of pottery which will enable any future 
explorer to date all the tells and khirbets" (Davis 2004: 29). Indeed, his 
historiographical framework and the identification of Tell el-Hesi with ancient 
Lachish did not survive the test of time. But his methodological innovations — the 
stratigraphic approach to a tell, the research strategy of typology creation and his 
typological systematics — served as cornerstones for everything that was done later.  
3. Early archaeological explorations 1900-1932: Sellin, Albright, and 
Garstang 
In modern terminology, we would say that the answer to the question of Ai's 
location was strongly underdetermined by the combination of geographical, 
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topographical and toponymical (onomastic) data that was used throughout the 
nineteenth century. Notwithstanding the confident words of each writer in turn, the 
issue remained unresolved (A1).   
It was Ernst Sellin who first pointed to a potential source of evidence that could solve 
the conundrum. Standing, literarily "with the book of Joshua in hand" near Deir-
Diwan, the young theology professor from Vienna identified "with certainty the 
remains of two ancient cities" in Et-Tell and Khirbet Haiyan and was confident that 
"we have to discover ancient Ai in the one and ancient Beth-Aven (Josh 7:2) in the 
second" (Sellin 1900: 2-4). However, "Determining which is which can hardly be 
achieved without excavations"  (My italics). 
 Sellin criticized Robinson's "uncharacteristically cursory observation" in Et-Tell, 
noting that the above-surface indication of ancient settlement should not be hewn 
stones but sherds, of which he saw a lot. This criticism may have been somewhat 
unfair, but it shows how much had been learned since the days of the first scholars-
travelers. 
 Sellin later turned into archaeology himself,9 but for some reason did not try to 
excavate either Et-Tell or Khirbet Haiyan.  The region of Deir-Diwan was first 
explored archaeologically only more than twenty years later, when William Foxwell 
Albright, the new director of the American Schools of Oriental Studies, toured the 
area accompanied by students and colleagues, sampling sherds as they went. 
Albright's conclusions concerning the location of Ai were summarized in a nine-page 
appendix (Albright 1924 Appendix V) to an extensive article about his excavations at 
Tell el-Fûl. In the type of intellectual tour de force that characterized much of his 
works, he discussed the scriptural texts (Hebrew origin and the Septuagint), the 
etymology of Arab place-names, the writing of previous scholars, and the local 
geography and concluded that "Beyond all doubt is the fact that et-Tell is the only 
                                                           
9  He conducted (alone and with others) excavations in Ta'anach, Jericho, and Shechem.  
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tell 10 in the whole neighborhood, besides being by far the most suitable location, so 
far as the topographical indications of the Bible go."  He conjectured Tell Haiyan to 
be the site of another Ai – the monarchic one mentioned as Ayat or Aya in Isa. 10:28 
and I Chr.7:28 as well as the post-exilic Ai from Ezr. 2:28 and Neh. 7:32. This Israelite 
town, maintained Albright, cannot occupy the same place as the Canaanite Ai 
because "All the cries [sic] of Ai must be harmonized with the statement in Josh. 8:28 
that Joshua destroyed Ai, and made it a mound (tell) for ever [sic], which can only 
mean that Ai remained a ruin from the conquest to the date of composition of 
Joshua, some centuries later."  
The novelty in Albright's approach lay in his use of sherds collected on the surface as 
chronological evidence: "out of large quantities of potsherds examined [from Et-Tell] 
all but one or two percent were Canaanite… The few non-Canaanite sherds were… 
Arabic … Apparently no archaeologist has previously examined the site with a trained 
eye for potsherds. This examination will surely remove the last doubts as to the 
identity of Et-Tell with the biblical Ai." 
 So far, so good. But Albright's analysis of the sherds also led him to some 
unexpected conclusions. The relevant paragraphs are worth citing nearly in full, both 
because they are highly pertinent to what follows and because they portray Albright 
differently than what is often said of him (italics are mine): 
Having established the identity of et-Tell with Ai anew, let us turn our 
attention for a moment to some historical consequences to be deduced from 
the archaeological examination of the tell. As observed above, all the 
hundreds of potsherds inspected, with some insignificant Arab exceptions, 
were Canaanite. But, almost to the consternation of the writer, they proved 
to be, not Late Canaanite, but Middle Canaanite (Middle Bronze). All the 
sherds were hand-modeled, hardly a single wheel-made piece appearing … 
During the following Late Canaanite period, nearly all vases are wheel-made… 
                                                           
10 That is, the only artificial mound.  
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If Ai was destroyed during the invasion of Palestine by Israel, under Joshua's 
leadership, which we may date to about 1230 B.C. …  one would have a right 
to expect Late Bronze pottery on the summit of the mound. …. But all this 
stage, with its Phoenician and Cypriote sherds, its characteristic metal bowl 
rims, etc., is entirely lacking. Instead it belongs unmistakably to the preceding 
Middle Bronze period (roughly 2000-1600 B. C.),... apparently, therefore, we 
are forced to conclude that Ai was destroyed centuries before the invasion of 
Israel under Joshua, between the seventeenth and the fifteenth centuries, 
presumably in the sixteenth.  
Let no one think that this conclusion is forced and premature; the writer has, 
in company with members of the American School, combed the surface of the 
tell on more than one occasion, examining thousands of sherds from all parts 
of the summit.  (Albright 1924:146-7) 
So, to reconcile his conclusions from the analysis of Et-Tell pottery with his favored 
chronology for the Joshua conquest (see A4 below), Albright hypothesized early, pre-
Joshua, waves of Israelite conquests in Canaan. This theory he was to abandon later.   
Garstang's sounding: Six years after Albright's field survey at Et-Tell, a sounding 
excavation was conducted there by John Garstang, the former director of the 
Palestinian Department of Antiquities (and a professor of archaeology at the 
University of Liverpool). A short editorial note in the bulletin of the British Palestine 
Exploration Fund (Jan. 1929) reports that the excavation "disclosed the walls of Ai, 
and it was reported that the city dated from the Early Bronze Age, and was totally 
destroyed in the Late Bronze Age." The note informed that "Professor Garstang was 
making a study of other sites mentioned in the books of Joshua and Judges … the 
main subject of his expedition is to endeavour to date the conquest of Canaan by 
Joshua." 
Garstang's work in Et-Tell was brief. From Albright (1929a, 1929b) we learn that he 
stayed there only a few days and concentrated his soundings outside the city wall. 
"The shreds so far examined… carry us down to a period later than the end of Tell 
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Beit Mirsim D, but earlier than C, i.e., to about the fifteenth century B.C." which 
reinforced Albright's own dating. Except for a minor difference in terminology11, 
then, the independent results of Albright and Garstang—unquestionably, the two 
leading figures in the Palestinian archaeology of the time—agreed.  
Interestingly, Garstang never communicated the result of his work in Et-Tell in a 
professional publication, and later scholars who refer to them invariably cited his 
popular book "Joshua, Judge" (Garstang 1931). The book is a plea for the "early 
Exodus hypothesis" (see A4 below) —which Garstang held (as an increasingly 
isolated view) to his last days—presenting Garstang's excavations at Ai, Hazor, and 
(chiefly) Jericho as providing tangible support to this hypothesis (Garstang 
1931:54).12 The discussion of Ai (pp. 149-159) follows the nineteenth-century 
tradition of juxtaposing the biblical narrative with the local topography. A short 
appendix paragraph (pp. 355-6) contains the archaeological information. The city 
wall is identified as belonging to the Middle Bronze Age by its masonry style and by 
"a sherd of M.B.A 1 technique picked out of the bonding." As for the ceramics 
collected elsewhere on the site, "M.B.A wares were most abundant, there was found 
a considerable proportion of L.B.A 1 including … a Cypriote wish-bone handle, but 
nothing of Mykenaean [sic] date or character, nor any local fabrics of a date later 
than 1400 B.C." 
To sum up, the consensus view in the early 1930s, based on the results of two 
prominent archaeologists, was that ancient Ai is buried under the mound of Et-Tell 
and that it was destroyed in the fifteen century B.C. This accorded well with one 
hypothesis regarding the chronology of early Israel (see below), and challenged the 
other. Due to the centrality of the Ai episode in the story of the conquest of Canaan 
by the Israelites, it was felt 13 that a full-scale excavation could help determine both 
                                                           
11  The fifteenth century B.C is referred to as Middle Bronze in Albright 1934, and as Late Bronze here. 
This discrepancy in archaeological nomenclature is immaterial to our subject.  
12  All these conclusions were later revised by subsequent excavations.  
13  According to Vincent (1937:231) the idea was first proposed by Garstang.  
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the time and the character of the Israelites' conquest of Canaan and, by implication, 
the date of the Exodus and a large part of the biblical chronology as well.  
4. Digression: When did the Exodus happen?  
Starting with Albright's analysis (1924) cited above, estimating the time of the 
Israelite's exit from Egypt and their arrival in Canaan became central to all the 
deliberations on Ai. A short digression on this topic is, therefore, due here.  
The task of fixing the historical dates of the biblical accounts has occupied 
orientalists, archaeologists, and biblical scholars since antiquity. It gained fresh 
impetus from the archaeological discoveries in the Levant during the late nineteenth 
century. Of particular interest were the timing of the Exodus and the Conquest of 
Canaan, on which there were two schools of thought: The "late" hypothesis placed 
the conquest in the final decades of the thirteenth century B.C., with the Exodus 
preceding it by about one generation. The "early" hypothesis posited that both 
events occurred during the fifteenth century B.C., the conquest taking place at its 
very end.  
Initially, these two hypotheses were based almost exclusively on information derived 
from studies in ancient Egypt. Since no record of anything similar to the biblical story 
was found, both schools inferred from what they considered to be indirect evidence. 
The "late" hypothesis (Albright 1921:63) (a) pointed to the accordance of the name 
of the "storage cities" Pithom and Ramesses (Ex. 1:11) with sites from the reign of 
Ramesses II and III; (b) used inscriptions from Ramesses III mortuary temple as a 
basis for estimation of the appearance of the Philistines in Palestine14; and (c) 
considered the Merneptah's Stella (ca. 1210 B.C.) as providing a terminus ad quem 
for the conquest, with the Exodus about 40 years earlier. The "early" hypothesis 
(Garstang 1931:53-6) relied (a) on the similarities between names of Canaanite cities 
mentioned in the Book of Joshua and places named in the "Execration texts" from 
the Egyptian Middle Kingdom; (b) on reports  (in the Tell – el Amarna letters) of 
                                                           
14 Since the Philistines are mentioned in the book of Judges but not in Joshua, they should have 
arrived shortly after the Israelite conquest.  
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unrest in Canaan during the fourteenth century B.C. Canaan, identifying the "Habiru" 
mentioned therein with the Hebrew tribes; and (c and perhaps most importantly) 
was inspired by the figure of 480 years mentioned in I Kings 6:1 as the span between 
the Exodus and the construction of Solomon's temple which (as all agreed) must 
have taken place toward the end of the 10th century B.C.15 
 
 
It is apparent from the above that Albright's conclusions from Et-Tell (that it is the 
site of biblical  Ai and that it was destroyed in the sixteenth or fifteenth century B.C.) 
challenged his view that Joshua's conquest happened several hundred years later. 
His solution to this problem was based on the Wellhausenian conceptualization of 
the Bible which he held at the time (Albright 1921): 
 
… the account of the conquest of Palestine in the Old Testament is highly 
schematized, and contains the record of events spread out in reality over 
centuries. We know that there were several Hebrew invasions: one under 
Abram … in the seventeenth century; another of the Bene Yosef somewhat 
later, continuing down to the Amarnah Age; … and finally the great invasions 
of Israel under Joshua, and Judah under Caleb, falling roughly about 1230 B.C. 
To which of these are we to ascribe the destruction of Jericho and Ai? 
 
Albright concluded that Jericho, Ai, and Bethel were all captured and destroyed 
during the Bene-Yosef invasion, which "presumably occurred during the anarchic 
period between the break-up of the Hyksos Empire and the establishment of the 
Egyptian, that is between 1600 and 1550 B. C., say about three and a half centuries 
before Joshua." 
 
Albright's arguments for this hypothesis should not concern us here, for he was to 
rescind it later (Albright 1934: 10, A9). His belief that the "main" conquest of Canaan 
by the Israelites took place during the last decades of the thirteenth century B.C., 
 
 
 
15 The "early Exodus" hypothesis was more popular at the beginning of the twentieth century. It 
receded to a minority view during the following years, to large extent because of Albright's works. 
Neither of these hypotheses, nor any other one seeking to place the Exodus and the Conquest of 
Canaan in a realistic frame, is now consensual among scholars (cf. Wallach 2018, 2019a and 
citations therein). 
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however, was solidified by his later seminal excavations in Tell Beit Mirsim and at 
Bethel (Albright 1929a, 1934).  
5. Interlude: Albright's inferential strategy 
Albright's main research instrument was ceramic typology (he was later faulted for 
not paying adequate attention to stratigraphy, cf. Greenberg 1987; Dever 1993). It 
was the combination of his meticulous attention to minute details of sherds with his 
gargantuan knowledge of languages, history, archaeology and geography of the 
ancient Levant that made him the most influential figure in biblical archaeology for a 
couple of generations. His excavations at Tell el-Full (Albright 1924), Tell Beit-Mirsim 
(1929a) and at Bethel (1934) were, by all accounts, the major steps in biblical 
archaeology and ceramic typology of the time (Herr 2002). Basically, he followed 
Petrie's strategy of combining outside references, local (mainly sequential) 
considerations and historiographic hypotheses for both classification and 
interpretation of the pottery. Unlike Petrie, however, he was not starting from an 
almost-blank page but could draw on earlier results, both his own and others'.  The 
following quotations give a taste of his methodology (italics mine): 
 Drawing on parallels from other works: 
The results of Phythian-Adams at Ashkelon, where the Philistine 
pottery appeared just above a burned level, which separated it from 
the stratum containing Cypro-Phoenician and Aegean sherds, have 
been fully confirmed elsewhere. … At Tell Beit Mirsim our results have 
been identical with the observations of Mackenzie… (1929a: 9) 
 Using late results to refine prior ones: 
Recapitulating the results, we find that the pottery from Gibeah I and 
II belongs with [sic] the end of Bliss's Pre-Israelite and the beginning 
of Macalister's Fourth Semitic; the more exact dating possible for the 
first and second periods at Gibeah enables us to assign more exact 
dates … and thus marks a distinct step forward in the knowledge of 
Early Iron Age pottery of the first phase. (1924: 16) 
 Using pottery classification to create or support historiographic hypotheses:  
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It is not difficult to fix the date of the close of period B. The pottery 
from the latter part of the period is identical with that of Megiddo IV, 
aside from certain local characteristics. The recent work of Guy and 
his brilliant discovery of the stable area, prove that this stratum is 
Solomonic. Tel el-Ful II, the period of Saul, [14] is distinctly earlier. The 
thorough destruction of the city cannot be dated in the reign of 
Solomon himself, but may be ascribed with absolute security to 
Shishak… (1934: 18). 
 Attempting to weave diverse inferential strands into a coherent and 
converging conclusion: 
There are four principal lines of evidence for the date, and all agree to 
pointing us to the second half of the twelfth century B.C. (1924:48) 
With the general evidence of the pottery agrees that of the scarabs, 
since the two scarabs of Amenophis  II from a tomb belonging to the 
latest Canaanite occupation of Jericho only point to cir. 1400 as a 
maximum date, while the allow considerably lower dates… (1939: 20) 
The use of historiographic hypotheses to determine the chronology of pottery 
sequences, themselves created to establish historiographic hypotheses, raises, of 
course, a risk of circularity. The fact that Albright "to the consternation of the writer" 
deduced from sherds gathered on the mound of Et-Tell that the ancient town there 
could not have been destroyed at a period expected from his historiographic theory 
shows, however, that circularity is not inevitable. I shall return to the question of 
circularity in the next division (B2).   
6. The Et-Tell excavations, 1932-1935 
Influenced by the notion that the mound of Et-Tell may contain the clue to biblical 
chronology, Baron Edmund de Rothschild, a long-term supporter of both the 
humanities, the sciences,16 and Zionism, offered to finance an excavation there 
                                                           
16 He was, among other things, a member of the Académie de Beaux-Arts and a founder and 
benefactor of Institut Henri Poincaré for mathematics. 
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under the auspices of the Louvre Museum. Following a recommendation by the 
museum's curator of Near Eastern antiquities, Professor René Dussaud, he chose a 
young archaeologist named Judith Krause to conduct the excavations. 
A few biographical details are due here (H. Krause in Marquet-Krause through 
Dussaud 1949 pp. 5-6; Barag 1997), not only because of the centrality of Krause 
(later Marquet-Krause) and her excavations to our story. but also because they are 
relevant to the topic of the relationship between scholars' backgrounds and their 
beliefs, discussed in the next division (sections B5, B6). Judith Krause was born in 
Palestine in 1906 to parents that were deeply involved in the Zionist activities of the 
time. Her mother was a member of the Hankin family which played a central role in 
the Yishuv, and her father was (among other things) the director of the Sejera 
pioneers' training farm and later of the Mikve-Israel agricultural school. Markedly 
talented and hard-working, she finished the Herzliya Hebrew Gymnasium in Tel-Aviv 
with a good knowledge of French, English, Hebrew, and Arabic and went to study in 
Paris. There she drifted from ancient languages to archaeology and wrote a thesis on 
ancient buildings in the Middle East.  
Krause was not only very young (25-26), and a sole female in the men's community 
of biblical archaeologist, when she was assigned to one of the most coveted 
opportunities in the Palestinian archaeology of the time. More significantly, she had 
almost no active experience in field archaeology. Her first step was, therefore, to 
enroll herself in Garstang's excavations in Jericho for one season in 1932.  
In the same year, she made a short prospective tour to the site of Et-Tell. In a later 
(unpublished) reports, she wrote that already then she noticed "a strange amalgam 
of very archaic sherds and Israelite sherds, [of] at least one millennium later" 
(Marquet-Krause 1934: 8). The question of how could she, in what must have been a 
visit of several hours, detect what two very knowledgeable veterans could not, shall 
be discussed in the second division (B1).  
The excavations proper started in September 1933, with a workforce of fifty men 
from the local population of Deir Diwan. The somewhat-older Jewish archaeologist 
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Shmuel Yeivin, "already familiar with the archaeology of the terrain," served as 
Krause's co-director, and both her parents helped in administrative tasks. The work 
had to be halted after six weeks because of "political agitation in the Muslim centers 
of Palestine" (1934: 9).  
The findings from this short season, however, were significant. Strong stone walls, 
built on the bedrock and supported by massive earthwork, enclosed the ruins of an 
ancient city, with a necropolis outside it. An imposing building, constructed with 
unhewn stones, was excavated on the mound's summit, and Krause identified it as 
the city's palace and suspected that part of it enclosed a sanctuary. That city was 
destroyed and burned to the ground.  Above a thick layer of debris and ashes stood 
simple walls of a later, unfortified settlement. 
 What made these findings not just significant but extraordinary was the chronology 
of the structures: Krause dated the city, with its walls and the necropolis, to the Early 
Bronze period. Hesitantly, she adds that "some [of the sherds) seem to be 
attributable to the Middle Bronze." As to the later unwalled settlement, she dated it 
with certainty to the Iron Age 1, with two successive phases of construction but 
without any stratification. (Marquet-Krause 1934; Marquet-Krause and Yeivin 1934; 
Marquet-Krause and Yeivin 1935).  
There is no doubt that the young excavator realized the implications of her findings: 
If the walled city was destroyed in the Early Bronze Age (which ended 2,200 B.C.) and 
was never rebuilt, it could not have been conquered by Joshua and the Israelite 
tribes, irrespective of whether they entered Palestine in the fifteenth century (as 
assumed by the "early" hypothesis) or in the thirteenth century B.C. (as posited by 
the "late" one) (A4). Nor would Albright's conjecture of "prior early conquests" (A3) 
solve the problem because these were also assumed to happen during the Middle 
Bronze or the early Late Bronze period. Besides, the identification of an early Iron 
Age settlement—that is, within the period presumed to be covered by the Book of 
Judges—conflicted with the notion of Ai remaining "a heap of ruins, a desolate place 
to this day" (Josh. 8:28).  
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What was clear to the young archaeologist was also clear to others: Her co-
director,Shmuel Yeivin, referred to the result as "surprising" (Yeivin 1937).17 Her 
teacher Dussaud later wrote:  "The consequences of this (inhabitation) hiatus, 
precisely at a time when one expects to find the most loaded story, were so serious 
– since they put the historicity of chapters VII and VIII of Joshua in doubt -  that I 
suggested to her to publish nothing from the first season and to concentrate next 
year on a verification of this so unexpected result" (Marquet-Krause through 
Dussaud 1949:10). Marquet-Krause thanked Albright and pére Louis-Hughes Vincent 
from the Ėcole Biblique for "helping, in many discussions, to clarify many problems 
related to the excavation and its consequences" (Marquet-Krause and Yeivin 
1934:30; cf. also Albright 1934:3 and Vincent 1937: 256), which means that they had 
an almost real-time access to the findings and must have been aware of their 
implications.18   
 Notwithstanding Dussaud's advice, Krause did publish a preliminary report on her 
first excavation season in two forms: One in Hebrew, written as a report to the 
editor of the Bulletin of the Jewish Palestine Exploration Society Yediot (Marquet-
Krause and Yeivin 1934), and one in English, in the Quarterly of the Department of 
Antiques in Palestine (Marquet-Krause and Yeivin 1935). In both reports, the city is 
tentatively dated to the Early Bronze Age (though the existence of some sherds 
belonging to the Middle Bronze is mentioned as a possibility, to be explored later), 
and the unwalled settlement built above it to the early Iron Age. A longer report in 
French, which was not published at the time (Marquet-Krause 1934) and appeared 
only in the posthumous compendium of 1949 was more forthcoming about the 
                                                           
17 Oddly, writing forty years later Yeivin said that "The present writer, however, knows that there 
were among the large quantity of sherds recovered from the last burnt phase of the occupation…  
[some] which should really be designated as 'Transitional period between EC and MC' … There was 
also …  a single large sherd of buffish-green, medium sized, carinated bowl … which he considered at 
the time LC I, …." (Yeivin 1971: 51). Coming after Callaway's independent excavations (A10) that 
verified Marquet-Krause's chronological inference, this remark seems particularly strange and, for all I 
know, has never received any scholarly attention.   
18 Curiously, there is no mention of Garstang having visited the site or taking a look at the findings, 
though he was himself excavating in Jericho at the time.  
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discrepancy between her conclusions and those of "the illustrious researcher 
professor Garstang" but allows for the possibility of a revision by further analysis. 
Neither of these short reports alludes to the historiographic implications, but one 
may safely assume that they were apparent to most of those who read them, which 
must have heightened the expectations toward the next season.  
The second season at Et-Tell, now directed solely by Marquet-Krause (newly married 
to the orientalist Yves Krause), began in June 1934 and lasted five months. The 32-
pages preliminary report (Marquet-Krause 1935a) naturally adds many details. The 
analysis of the sanctuary, in which she recognized three stages, and of findings in 
tombs around the city contributed significantly to the understanding of the third 
millennium B.C in the Southern Levant.19 In what concerns us here, the report is 
marked especially by its decisive conclusion (translation and italics mine): 
The epoch of Middle- and Late Bronze are inexistent. The sherds of Iron Age I 
are mixed with those of the Late Bronze … On the arrival of Joshua this city 
was, therefore, destroyed a long time ago. And this, undoubtedly, is the 
reason why the Israelites called it "Ha'Ai" – the ruin. We do not know what 
name it could have had in the 3rd millennium. However, the general 
description of this place that one finds in the Bible corresponds perfectly to 
the general situation of the Tell and of the ravine, which would allow an 
ambush like the one narrated in the book of Joshua. This leads us to believe 
that chapter VII and VIII of Joshua, that could be assumed to be historical, are 
part of a legend, as is the account of the capture of Jericho, but a legend that 
is based on a real place."  (pp. 340-342)  
These short and unambiguous sentences were, unfortunately, also the final ones 
Marquet-Krause got to say about the matter. She returned in November 1935 for a 
third excavations season with an increased workforce of 160 men but had to stop 
short when she became gravely ill. She returned to France for treatment and died a 
                                                           
19  Albright's pupil Ernest Wright relied on Marquet-Krause's findings (together with archeological 
discoveries from Beth-Shan and other sites) in his definitive treatise on the typology, chronology and 
sub-division of the Early Bronze Age (Wright 1936, 1937). 
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few months later. Her truncated report for the third season (Marquet-Krause 1936) 
appeared only in the memorial compendium,20 which included the notes and 
drawings prepared by the excavator and was published by Dussaud (Marquet-Krause 
through Dussaud 1949) in the hope that "they could be fruitful again in the hand of 
specialists of Palestinian archaeology." As we shall see (A10), this hope was indeed 
fulfilled, even if only in a small way. 
7. Interlude: Marquet-Krause's inferential technique 
Judith Marquet-Krause did not live to publish a complete professional account of her 
work at Et-Tell, but her reasoning is evident in the 32-pages Rapport Sommaire 
(Marquet-Krause 1935) published after the second season of excavation. 
Stratigraphy played some role in delineating sub-periods within the Early Bronze 
Age, especially in the sanctuary, and trivially in the sense that the Iron Age 
constructions were built above the ash layer of the Bronze Age. Apart from that, she 
relied solely on ceramic typology, and her main line of inference involved comparing 
her finds to pottery types that were excavated and dated elsewhere.  
 As in the case of Petrie (A2) and Albright (A5), chronological "anchors" 
founded on external (Egyptian) sources were important: 
Many cultic objects were distributed … picked up mainly from the 
second and the third Egyptian dynasty. (333) 
The flat-base dishes with flared walls … are exact replicas from the 
Thinite period (2nd dynasty) found in Sakkara. (333).   
 These anchors, however, were no longer as essential as in the earlier 
decades. Most of the parallels cited by Marquet-Krause referred to local 
findings, including yet-unpublished ones from excavations that were running 
parallel to hers. Her base of comparison, therefore, was broader and more 
refined than that of her predecessors: 
                                                           
20 This compendium had a troubled history: It was meant to be published in 1940. When the world 
war broke, the final proofs disappeared and the printing plates were melted for ammunition by the 
German occupation force. An early proof, however, miraculously survived, and formed the basis for 
the 1949 publication.  
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A small votive bed… recently Mr. Rowe found a similar one in Gezer, 
within a tomb from the Early Bronze. (321) 
 
The ensemble is perfectly close to that of level IV in Megiddo, that 
was put [by the excavators there] at the beginning of the 3rd 
millennium, which accords with our independently constructed 
dating. (336) 
 
The ceramics from this epoch … is represented, in particular, by big 
jars with pointed base… and a circular protrusion around their neck, 
and a quantity of cooking pots with two annular handles … Thanks to 
the amiability of professor Albright we could compare these sherds 
with those from Bethel, that belong to Iron 1. (340). 
 
All the ceramics from the necropolis reached us in a rare state of 
conservation… One finds there … many analogies with those from 
other Palestinian sites from the Early Bronze like Ophel, Baisan [Beit- 
Shean], Gezer, Megiddo, and Jericho… (343). 
It was possible, for example, to diagnose that certain Egyptian-style artifacts found in 
one level were typical ("une réplique exact") to a much earlier period (1935:335, 
1949:31). Instead of serving as a chronological "anchor," therefore, these unique 
 
findings were categorized as intrusive!  (But See (B3)). 
 
 
  Marquet-Krause was able to derive definitive conclusions not only 
from the presence but also from the absence of typological 
evidence. 
The époques of Middle and Late sont inexistentes… This allows us to 
conclude that 800 years have passed between the violent destruction, 
by an unknown enemy, of the royal city near 2000 [B.C.] and its short 
resurrection around 1200. Upon the arrival of Joshua this city was, 
therefore, long destroyed. … 
 
The legitimacy of inferring from absence is the subject of (B5) (Cf.  also Wallach 
2019b). For the time being, let me note that the problems associated with such 
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inference did not give Marquet-Krause any pause. Neither did it concern her 
contemporaries, as the next section shows.  
 A second level of inference then used her own findings to refine prior 
knowledge: The sequential levels of the sanctuary supported a sub-division of 
the Early Bronze age and enabled "to discern the evolution of the ceramic 
industry" along the third millennium B.C.  
Her last, unfinished and unpublished article (Marquet-Kruse 1936, Marquet-Krause 
through Dussaud 1949:30) discussed the evolution of ledge handles, thus refining 
the typology of an important fossile directeur that was identified by Petrie forty 
years earlier. One imagines that much more would have come up had she been able 
to continue her work.   
8. "A cause of some perplexity"   
This section is about the initial reactions to Marquet-Krause's findings and her 
interpretation of these findings. To bring home the importance and urgency assigned 
to the issue at the time, I would like to begin with some remarks written in 
December 1935. The writer was no other than Judith Marquet-Krause herself. In a 
letter to Shmuel Klein—then the dean of Erez-Israel studies at the Hebrew University 
of Jerusalem, the chairman of the Jewish Palestine Exploration Society, and the 
editor of its periodical Yediot—she refers to an article (Market-Krause 1935b) that 
she had sent for publication there (my italics)21 
…As to the findings – rest assured that the conclusions were reached only 
after extensive debate. I have submitted, objectively and with a clear 
conscience, the results of my work over the course of three years, without 
the involvement of my personal emotions or of my attitudes or connections 
(Jewish national attitudes and connections) to the Bible.   
…. These conclusions, which I have detailed in my article, are drawn from the 
results of the excavations conducted to date. As God is my witness, I hope to 
                                                           
21 Quoted (in Hebrew; English translation by D. Landman) in Elitzur 2014, itself a subject of (A12).  
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find evidence that corroborates the Biblical narrative in the upcoming 
excavations. 
…However, if you decide that this position should not be publicized for 
religious or national reasons, I will take your view into consideration and will 
not object to concluding my article with a broad summary of the findings. 
Klein replied briefly, expressing his belief that a proof for "a settlement that was 
there before the period of the conquest" will be found in the next excavation 
seasons. There is no sign that he made use of the excavator's extraordinary offer to 
modify her article prior to publication. But the fact that Marquet-Krause was 
motivated to write such a letter, as well as the editor's response, demonstrate how 
disturbing her results and the implications thereof were to people of [Jewish-] 
Zionist persuasions, herself included, at the time.  
And not only to them: The "notes and news" section of the Quarterly Statement of 
the (British) Palestine Exploration Fund from April 1936, citing Dussaud's (1935, see  
A9 below) analysis of the excavation, reported that:  
The results of the recent excavations at Ai will cause some perplexity to those 
who pin their faith too simply to the spade. The eminent French 
archaeologist, M Dussaud , writes … "Mme. Marquet concludes that the site 
was desolate when the Israelites began the conquest of Canaan  … These 
excavations … lead to the conclusion that the narratives describing the 
capture of Ai are no more historical than those which describe the crossing of 
the Jordan or the fall of Jericho."  
This relatively nonchalant report was a cause for an uproar, as evident from the 
minutes of the annual general meeting of the Fund three months later (PEFQS July 
1936: 123-131). A certain Mr. Edwards spoke to express  
  .. on behalf of several of the members, our disapproval of the character of 
some of the notes that have appeared in the April Quarterly Statement…    
This Fund was started by Christian people and very largely for the purpose of 
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demonstrating to the unbelieving world the truth of the story as recorded in 
the Bible. …   On page 54 of the April Quarterly Statement we are told that 
some excavations made by some French people at Ai will cause some 
perplexity to those who pin their faith simply to the spade … I beg to protest 
very strongly against the tone of that article and hope it will not be repeated. 
The editor of the Quarterly Statement, invited by the chairman to reply, opened by 
expressing deep sympathy with the protest "the more so that I was myself brought 
up in the atmosphere which he still so admirably represents" and informed the 
meeting that he offered his resignation if this was felt necessary to relieve the Fund 
of any embarrassment. As to the disturbing paragraph, it was only a quote of an 
argument made by a well-known French archaeologist, Professor Dussaud, printed 
to draw comments from knowledgeable people like Cannon Phythian-Adams22 and 
Professor Garstang, and that the former has already responded.  
Garstang himself was present at the meeting and was invited to comment, but what 
he had to say was disjointed: The whole thing, he suggested, is a misunderstanding, 
and he sympathizes with both Mr. Edwards and the editor; as to the excavation of 
Et-Tell itself, he heard "hearsay" that it uncovered only a small part of the mound. 
His dating for the site is supported by Albright.23 There is some doubt whether the 
site is indeed the place of ancient Ai (though he himself believed it is.) His experience 
shows that once a site has been burned, it is liable to denudation… "So long as there 
remains a doubt, the evidence of the excavation of Ai is incomplete and it cannot be 
adduced in an argument either as to the conquest of Palestine or the date of the 
exodus."   
The chairman (Sir Charles Marston) then closed the meeting with a few dismissive 
words about the "cursory excavation of what is alleged to be the site of Ai" and 
lauding Garstang's works and historiographic interpretations.  
                                                           
22  Like many other mentioned in these pages, Phythian-Adams was both an ordained reverend and 
an archaeologist. Among other things, he directed the excavations of ancient Ashkelon.  
23 Actually Albright by that time had already retracted his own estimate (see below A9), a fact that 
Garstang should have been aware of.  
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The "solution" of Phythian-Adams (1936), mentioned above, was to sacrifice the 
historicity of the Ai story, conjecturing it to be a monarchic-time addition created in 
the context of the adversity between the kingdoms of Judea and Israel. At the same 
time, he defended in strong words the general factuality of the conquest scenario, 
the "early" hypothesis for its date (A4), and Garstang's work in Jericho. Except for a 
short rebuttal by Vincent (1937, see below), Phythian-Adams' suggestions were 
mostly ignored. The reverberations of the "Ai debate," however, continued.  
9. The scholarly debate, 1934 - 1960 
The first comment in print on the Et-Tell excavations (Albright 1934) appeared just 
days after Marquet-Krause finished the second season and before she published her 
report. The occasion was Albright's article on his excavations at Bethel, where the 
most important finding, in his view, was a destruction layer dated to the thirteenth 
century B.C. (that is, to the end of the Late Bronze Age) followed by a simple Iron 
Age settlement. For him (and, through him, for at least two generations of 
archaeologist) these findings were pivotal:  
 We are compelled to identify it with the Israelite conquest.  In reaching this 
obvious and inescapable conclusion, the writer abandons a position which he 
has held for eleven years, and adopts the low date of the Israelite conquest 
of central Palestine. In connection with this change of position, he also 
abandons Garstang's view of the date of the Israelite capture of Jericho. (p. 
10). 
 How does this square with the findings from Et-Tell? Having followed Marquet-
Krause's excavations closely (p. 3), Albright endorsed her results as well as her 
interpretations.24 To the challenge posed by Marquet-Krause results to the biblical 
conquest narrative Albright had a creative solution: 
                                                           
24 About his own erroneous dating of the site (Albright 1924: 146) he had the following to say: "Both 
the writer and Professor Garstang were victims of a curious situation at et-Tell (Ai) …  The 'Middle 
Bronze' which we found there on the surface and in a trench outside the city wall was Early Bronze 
ware of a type which was then assigned to MB I.  The 'early Late Bronze' ware which we found was 
nearly all composed of cooking pot rims of a type which begins in the fifteenth century and continues 
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 We may also observe that the vicissitudes of Ai and Bethel cannot be 
separated; the two towns are so close together that only one could have any 
importance… in a given period. The name Ha-'ai means simply "the ruin" (par 
excellence) in Hebrew.    Bethel fell into the hands of the Israelites, who 
burned it to the ground, somewhere in the thirteenth century.  In tradition, 
since Ai was the precursor of Bethel, and was also destroyed by a foe who 
burned it to the ground, some eight centuries before, the former replaced 
the latter.  (1934:11. See also Albright 1935:15). 
Essentially, Albright suggested that the Ai story in the book of Joshua is etiological—
that is, it was created to explain the origin of prominent ruins. This part of his 
conjecture is not different from Marquet-Krause's "a legend based on a real site" and 
was shared by many. Albright's idea that the "true" story referred to Bethel, 
however, is open to many questions25 and was not embraced even by scholars like 
Vincent (1937: 260, see 9.2 below) and Yadin (1982), who defended the general 
historicity of the conquest narrative. 
Dussaud was the first out point to the ad-hoc character of Albright's "solution" 
(Dussaud 1935:351 n2): Why apply this logic, he asked, only to the story of Ai Josh. 7-
8 and not to the story of the conquest of Jericho in chapter 6, the legendary 
character of which is so apparent and could not be supported archaeologically?  As 
an alternative, he surmised that the story of the conquest of Ai was created to 
                                                           
for some six centuries with very little change.  By a strange coincidence, the pieces we saw belonged 
to the simplest form of the type in question, a form which might in itself very well date from the 
fifteenth century, but actually belongs to the twelfth! This experience is again a warning against over-
confidence in dating from isolated surface finds." 
It should be remembered that Albright (1924:147) mentioned thousands of sherds collected and 
analyzed (A3), so "isolated" here cannot be taken too literarily. But a lot changed between 1924 and 
1933, as discussed (B1) and (B2).   
25 Among other things, the Bible (Jud. 1) has a very different story about the capture of Bethel. One 
notes also that the very proximity between the sites was formerly used by Albright (1924:148, (A3)) as 
an argument for their synchronous conquest.  
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provide a ritual legitimation to the possession of the place. In a later article (Dussaud 
1937) he combined Marquet-Krause's results from Et-Tel with Albright's results from 
Bethel and a lot of textual analysis to hypothesize about the extinct name of the 
third-millennium city, before the Israelites named it "the ruin." It was, he surmised, 
originally called Beth-Hadad in honor of a Canaanite god, derogatively changed to 
Beth-Aven by biblical scribes, and later etiologically named as "Ha'ai that is by Beth-
Aven."  
9.1 Noth's challenge: A seminal contribution to the debate was made by the German 
biblical scholar Marin Noth. Although Dussaud, Albright, Garstang, and Phythian-
Adams differed in their interpretations of the archaeological results from Ai and in 
their reconstruction of the conquest of Canaan by the Israelites, they (and many 
others) did not doubt that such a conquest did take place. Noth, following his 
teacher Albrecht Alt, advanced a radically different opinion that was later called "the 
Peaceful Immigration hypothesis." This account interpreted the books of Joshua and 
Judges as tribal traditions, independently and locally created and amalgamated to a 
national lore by later editors.  Most of the "conquest" chapters in Joshua, for 
example, are confined to the allotment of the tribe of Benjamin.  
This interpretation was deduced from analysis and critique of the biblical texts. 
Noth's writings, however, show a profound and up-to-date acquaintance with the 
archaeological publications. The results from Et-Tell played an important part in a 
series of articles (Noth 1935, 1938a, 1938b) that he published following the 
excavation there.  
The contradiction between the seemingly-realistic biblical story in Josh. 7-8 and the 
archaeological results, asserted Noth, disappears when one recognizes the story as 
an etiological one. And the same holds for most of the conquest stories, especially 
those that include the phrase "until this day."26  Not only that, but one can deduce 
from the text who were the original creators of this story: The detailed topographical 
                                                           
26 But not, for example, the story in Jud. 1 about the conquest of Bethel which does not contain such 
a phrase, a point that Noth counts against Albright's conjecture that the story was transferred 
between the two sites (1935:29f). 
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knowledge that this narrative reflects could only come from the local (presumably 
Benjaminite) population who settled in the place as part of a local, tribal Landnahme 
and named it Ha'ai - "the ruin." The archaeological results, in ein überaus lehrreiches 
Beispiel (1938a:14) for independent confirmation, testify both to the very early 
destruction of the city and the existence of a local, Israelite population on the place 
later.  
9.2 A multitude of conquest scenarios: Noth's analysis presented a challenge, to 
which everybody who discussed the matter afterward felt obliged to react.   
The first systematic response came from Father Vincent (1937) the doyen of Biblical 
archeologists at the time (and the one who introduced Albright to archaeology). In 
an article dedicated to the memory of the late Marquet-Krause, which presented her 
results in a much more detailed form than she herself had the opportunity to,  
Vincent rebuked the participants of the 1936 annual meeting of the Palestine 
Exploration Fund (A8) for their dismissive attitude to the excavator and her work. He 
also rejected the suggestions of Albright and Phythian-Adams as artificial (because 
they attempted to salvage the biblical narrative while at the same time modifying it 
deliberately) and offered a solution of his own, to be mentioned shortly. But it was 
Noth's suggestion that concerned him the most since it led, "on the basis of a literary 
critique alone," to a negation pure et simple of the historicity of the biblical texts. 
Whatever historicity Noth was willing to allow (like the possibility of local, tribal 
campaigns) was, in Vincent's opinion, not worth retaining. 
The more so, because there exists, in Vincent's view, a simple and entirely convincing 
explanation for what happened at Et-Tell/Ai. Since these ruins, especially those of 
the walls and the ramparts, are so impressive even today, it is "believable in itself 
and in perfect concordance with the known local and temporal conditions" (p. 263) 
to assume that some Canaanite group, probably from adjacent Bethel, used it as 
improvised fortifications against the approaching Israelite invasion. The attackers, 
having just come from the desert and being inexperienced in the art of siege, might 
have initially considered the place as easy prey, but after a first painful defeat came 
to regard it as a mighty city to be conquered by stratagem. That a supernatural 
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element (Achan and the stolen spoil, Joshua's divination, etc.) was added to this 
entirely realistic episode is attributable to the "essentially religious character of the 
Bible." 
In a later series of articles, Albright (1935; 1939) set out to defend the historicity of 
the conquest episodes against "the nihilistic attitude of Professor Noth" and at the 
same time establish their timing in the thirteenth century B.C. against "the apodictic 
statements of Professor Garstang, Sir Charles Marston and others, all standing for 
considerable higher [i.e., earlier] dates." A description of Albright's detailed 
argumentation, centered on a discussion of the archaeological excavations in 
Megiddo, Beth-Shan and (especially) Lachish,27 as well as his own excavations in Tell 
Beit Mirsim and Bethel, will carry us far beyond our subject here. In what concerns 
Ai, he recognized that "the case of Ai has undoubtedly been responsible for a 
marked tendency in certain quarters to depreciate the historical content of the 
narratives of Joshua" (1939: 15) and reasserted his 1934 hypothesis, namely that a 
real thirteenth-century Bethel conquest was transformed to a narrative about a 
conquest of Ai.  And "what was more natural than that this tradition, current for 
many generations among  the Israelite inhabitants of Bethel, should have been 
attached to the impressive Canaanite ruins of Et-Tell, whose destruction actually 
preceded the  foundation of Bethel?" 
In the next quarter-century, Albright's views about the historicity of Joshua's 
conquest and its timing became "the received view" for most archaeologists and 
many biblical scholars. It was held, in particular, that excavations in the Tel-Beith-
Mirsim, Bethel, and Lachish (plus Yadin's excavations in Hazor in the 1950s) 
supported and confirmed these views. Albright's "Bethel–Ai replacement 
hypothesis," on the other hand, was generally considered speculative or just 
untenable (Yeivin 1937; Callaway 1968; Yadin 1982). The case of Ai/ Et-Tell became 
an "anomaly" in the Kuhnian sense, a single "outlier" (joined, according to some, by 
                                                           
27  Albright's argument relied heavily on the findings of the British excavations of Lachish, but at the 
same time insisted that their dates for the destruction of the site are too high (early). I return to this 
point in (B2), which discusses the problem of circularity.  
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another one from Jericho) to a generally successful theory. An anomaly to be 
explained away, usually as an etiological story created sometime in the Iron Age.  
Before continuing the next scenes in "the Ai story" let me summarize the main 
similarities and dissimilarities in the views mentioned in this section, as a 
preparation for the next one and for issues that shall be discussed in division B:  
1) All accepted that Et-Tell is the only site that fits the biblical descriptions of Ai 
and its conquest scenario. 
2) All accepted Marquet-Krause's inference that the site was only inhabited in 
the Early Bronze Age and again for a short period in the early Iron Age.  
3) All—including the Alt/Noth school—held that the books of Joshua and 
Judges, and in particular the conquest chapters (Jos 1-9 and Jud. 1), contain 
some historical content, and that light can be shed on this content by textual 
analysis, geographical considerations and archaeological discoveries.28 
4) And last but not least, all the scholars cited in this section, including 
"conservatives" such as Garstang and Albright and ordained priests such as 
Vincent and Phythian-Adams (and, later, Callaway and De-Vaux), – held that 
the biblical texts are not literarily accurate, but are the outcome of 
alterations, omissions and additions made by human scribes, and that their 
content reflects the knowledge, perceptions, and motivations of these 
scribes. This meta-assumption allowed a wide degree of freedom by selecting 
textual evidence for one's view, denying the evidential relevance of other 
passages, and interpreting a text in a manner different from its literal 
meaning.  Specifically, all but Vincent29 agreed that the excavation results 
from Et-Tel-Ai could not be reconciled with the biblical narrative in Jos. 7-8, 
and opted to consider this chapter as an etiological story, in one version or 
another. 
                                                           
28 The Alt / Noth school, of course, offered a different historiographical interpretation of the conquest 
chapters, namely as episodes in a long settlement process rather than a rapid conquest campaign. 
Prior to the works of Yohanan Aharoni in 1950s, scholars of this school also tended to assign lesser 
import to archaeological discoveries vis-à-vis the textual analysis.  But they did not maintain a 
"nihilistic" attitude to either the archaeological results or the biblical narrative. 
29 And even Vincent, as noted above, posited a conquest story different from the biblical narrative. 
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The first attempt to challenge this set of beliefs came in the 1960s (Grintz 1961, 
1971), and it was directed toward points (1) (the identification of Ai with Et-Tell) 
with, as its background, reservations about point (4) (the non-literal and selective 
interpretation of the biblical texts). Because Grintz's position is related to works that 
were published in later years, I defer its discussion to section A12 below. Point (3) 
(that the relevant biblical chapters point to some historical realities, which can be at 
least partially deciphered) was strongly challenged since the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, (A11).  
The next section describes a systematic attempt to test both point (1) (Ai=Et-tell) and 
(2) (Marque-Krause's results) archaeologically. 
10. The spade returns to Et-Tell, 1964-1972 
Joseph Callaway, a faculty member of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 
excavated Et-Tell intermittently between 1964 and 1972 with the express 
purpose "to carry forward the work of Mme. Marquet-Krause."   
The 1964 excavation (Callaway et al. 1965) verified Marquet-Krause's 
chronological scheme: A fortified city during the Early Bronze Age (he made a 
small correction to its chronology) and an Iron Age village, with nothing in the 
intervening period. The excavated area was expanded beyond what Marquet-
Krause dug, and this by itself put to rest Garstang's conjecture (A8) that the 
missing "Joshua's city" is hidden somewhere under the mound.  
In the Iron Age village Callaway, like Marquet-Krause before him, discerned two 
habitation phases, which he dated tentatively to 1200-1050 and 1050-1000 B.C, 
the second being "a little more than a camping phase." In neither phase was 
there any evidence of belligerencies; rather, "occupation seems to have been 
interrupted by periodic abandonment, not violent destruction." Callaway also 
noted that the Iron-Age settlement contained many cisterns and speculated that 
"an extended drought could have forced the abandonment of the village."    
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Besides the work at Et-Tell, Callaway also conducted in 1964 an exploratory 
excavation at Khirbet Haiyan, suggested by Robinson as the site of the biblical Ai 
(Callaway and Nicol 1966). A sounding down to the bedrock found evidence to 
Moslem, Byzantine and probably Roman occupation, but nothing earlier. 
Therefore, he crossed out Khirbet Haiyan as "not likely to yield evidence of a 
biblical site dating to the post-exilic period or earlier."  
Callaway returned to excavate at Et-Tell and its vicinity in 1966, 1968, and again 
in 1968-1972 (Callaway 1968, 1969, 1976; Callaway et al. 1969). His motivation, 
openly stated, was not only to expand on Marquet-Krause discoveries but also to 
seek some reconciliation between these discoveries and the biblical narrative:  
"Ai is simply an embarrassment to every view of the conquest that takes the 
biblical and archaeological evidence seriously… I am persuaded that there is too 
much historical evidence to call the conquest of Ai legend or etiology. … Noth's 
view that the capture of Ai is etiological legend is extreme, and I cannot accept 
it…" (1968). 
In the following years Callaway, in parallel to his excavations at Et-Tell (and at 
Khirbet Raddana, which shall not be discussed here), checked and eliminated all 
the other Ai-alternatives (A1). Khirbet Khudrya was found to be the remains of a 
Byzantine monastery, Khirbet Hay - Mamlukian, and "there is no Late Bronze 
evidence in the region east of Bethel that I can find."  (1968: 315)  
At the site of Et-Tell itself, Callaway's excavations did not produce anything 
substantially different from what was found before. But he did come up with an 
entirely novel theory (1976:30): Ai was indeed conquered by the Israelites, but 
not in the thirteenth or the fifteenth century, but in the late twelfth century B.C! 
What was conquered was not a mighty Canaanite city, but a small Iron-Age 
village, populated by earlier invaders, possibly Hivites, that settled on the debris 
of the Early Bronze citadel at the end of the Late Bronze Age. 
In short, Callaway suggested that the conquest mentioned in the Bible occured 
between the two Iron-Age phases at Et-Tell. Importantly, he saw this idea not as 
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a localized solution but a general one, pointing to what he considered as similar 
findings from other sites in Palestine: "The emerging picture of the conquest that 
I see in the archaeological evidence is like the Phase I settlement at Ai... This, I 
admit, is a less glorious picture of the conquest than Albright's Late Bronze dating 
implies or the biblical traditioners insist.  But to me, it is more realistic and 
credible, and it actually has more support from the biblical traditions."  
Callaway's historiographic reasoning here is somewhat circular: Because (already 
in that time) several sites that should have been conquered by Joshua showed 
Iron-Age occupation but no traces of a Late Bronze Age one, and because he 
assumed that some Israelite invasion must have taken place, he concluded that 
disruptions in these Iron-Age settlements testify to this invasion.  
As for archaeological evidence for the hypothesis from the Et-Tell site, Callaway 
presented two, one of which he seemed to retract later: First, contrary to his 
1965 article, his 1968 one reported (p. 320) signs of burning in one of the 
buildings of the first Iron Age phase. He did not repeat this claim in any of his 
following publications and completely rescinded it in an article he wrote for 
NEAEHL (Callaway 1993). Secondly, and more central to his argument, he noted 
that the settlers of the first Iron Age possessed knowledge in masonry (such as 
chiseling stone pillars) and agriculture (building cisterns) unexpected in "people 
newly arrived from the Transjordan desert" (1969:59). The second occupation 
phase, on the other hand, seemed to him less developed, with above-ground 
granaries replacing built storage facilities (1976:30) so that "If there is evidence 
of an Israelite population at Ai with a nomadic background reflected in the 
biblical traditions and affirmed by the fellow-travelers and continuers of both Alt 
and Albright" this should be it.  
 Callaway was certainly right to point out that both "early Israel" hypotheses (the 
Conquest and the Immigration) current at the time presupposed a movement of 
nomadic tribes into western Palestine, and also in his observation that the 
material culture of the Iron Age village at Et-Tell shows signs of a sedentary, 
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agriculturalist background.30 Apparently, he was not prepared to consider any 
hypothesis that did not include such a movement.31  
Crucial to Callaway's hypothesis is the dating of the Iron Age phases. Like 
Marquet-Krause (1935:340) before him, he dated both to the early Iron Age. He 
supported this estimation by comparing the pottery types that he found to those 
from other sites (1968: 317; Callaway et al. 1969:7-9) and by pointing out that 
"only one piece of pottery that is possibly burnished has been found in two 
seasons of work, and it is not clearly burnished.  Burnished pottery is typically 
present in the latter part of Iron Age I at other sites…" (Callaway et al. 1969:9). 
He opined that "This last characteristic tends to push back the Iron Age I 
occupation at Ai to the earliest possible date, conceivably before some of the last 
Late Bronze cities fell" (1968:7).  
Callaway's "Hivite" hypothesis failed to convince anybody and was criticized by 
quite a few. De Vaux (1969: 273-4) was quick to point out that it suffers from 
three problems:  (1) a fragile archaeological support (there is no evidence for a 
violent conquest of Iron-Age Et-Tell); (2) a speculative assumption of a "Hivite" 
migration into Late-Bronze Palestine, to which there is no support whatsoever; 
and (3) even if Callaway's scenario is accepted, it does not salvage the historicity 
of Josh. 7-8, which tells a very different story. Zevit (1983:32), who relied heavily 
on Callaway's reports to reaffirm that Et-Tell is indeed the site of ancient Ai, 
rejected his hypothesis for similar reasons, adding that the ceramics from both 
Iron-Age phases looked "Israelite", that is,  similar to those found in any other hill 
site in Iron Age I. 
An even sharper criticism, directed at the crucial point of the date of the Iron-Age 
village, was made by Finkelstein (2007). Because Callaway never authored a full 
publication of the remains from the Iron Age at the site (only of the Early Bronze 
                                                           
30 This is supported, for example, by an analysis of the results from his excavations at Khirbet 
Raddana, in the vicinity of Et-Tell (Lederman1999). 
31 Such as George Mendenhall's "Revolt hypothesis" (cf. e.g., Mendenhall 1962), of which he must 
have been aware, since he cites Mendenhall in support of his "Hivite" conjecture (1968:368). 
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ones), Finkelstein turned to Marquet-Krause's sketches and plates that appeared 
in the 1947 posthumous compendium (A6). By comparing these to sherds and 
vessels from other sites such as Shiloh, Megiddo, Aphek, Giloh and Izbet-Sarta 
(pp. 108-110), he concluded that the Iron-Age settlement at Et-Tell existed 
distinctly later than stated by Callaway, beginning at the eleventh and 
terminating in the tenth century. Most of the sites that Finkelstein uses for 
comparison were excavated and published after Callaway left Et-Tell, but in 
Finkelstein's opinion Callaway could and should have come to much the same 
conclusions based on assemblages from Megiddo and other sites, which were 
available to him, and his interpretation was motivated by "a highly conservative 
reading of the biblical texts."  
Callaway himself seemed to vacillate about his theory. He withdrew it totally in 
1985, raised it again, though in a hypothetical tone, in 1992 (p. 130), and did not 
mention it at all in his encyclopedia article about Ai (1993). By that time both the 
knowledge base and the hypotheses landscape have considerably changed.  
11. The subsidence of the Ai debate, 1970-2014   
Callaway's attempt to reconcile the biblical narrative with the "embarrassment" of 
Et-Tell was quickly becoming irrelevant in the eyes of most scholars of the relevant 
disciplines. 
 Starting with Yohanan Aharoni in the mid-1950s,32 some archaeologists and biblical 
scholars adopted the Peaceful Immigration hypothesis advanced by Albrecht Alt and 
Martin Noth (A  9.1). In this account, material evidence for the establishment of the 
Israelites in the Land of Canaan was to be found not in the destruction layers of 
Canaanite cities but rather in the simple Iron-Age villages in the hilly regions.  Viewed 
in this light the situation at Ai/Et-Tell was not an anomaly, but the rule.   
                                                           
e.g., Mazazr 1990; Finkelstein 1998; Morrey 2004; Dever 2011.  
32 I say more about the "emergence of Israel" hypotheses and their interplay with the archaeological 
discoveries in Wallach 2018 and Wallach 2019. For more details see, 
39  
 
Even archaeologists who defended some form of a conquest hypothesis (e.g., Yadin 
1982) acquiesced to the Ai story being an etiological legend.  This seemed inevitable 
since, as Zevit (1983) observed, any candidate for ancient Ai should produce 
evidence of a Bronze Age city and (assuming identity with pre- and post-exilic cities 
with similar names) an Iron-Age settlement, and in the vicinity of Bethel only Et-Tell 
qualifies. The excellent fit between the geography and topography of Et-Tell and the 
narrative details supports, rather than weakens, its identification as etiological story, 
told first "by and for people intimately familiar with the realia and topography of the 
area" (Zevit 1983: 32) and incorporated much later, through a process of theological 
interpretation, into the national saga. 
 During the 1970s, as additional discrepancies between the biblical narrative and the 
archaeological finds were piling up, the Peaceful Immigration hypothesis became a 
mainstream consensus.  
Another shift of opinion happened during the 1980s and the 1990s. Results from 
more and more excavations and wide-areas surveys made it apparent that the 
material culture of the simple Iron Age settlements, in Et-Tell as well as elsewhere in 
western Palestine, was local, without any sign of foreign origin. This and other issues 
put a strain on the Peaceful Immigration hypothesis, and most scholars in the 
relevant disciplines now hold that the inhabitants of these settlements, which later 
coalesced to the population of the kingdoms of Israel and Judea, was autochthonic. 
Under this hypothesis, too, the ruins at Et-Tell present no special challenge and a 
search for archeological evidence for the dates of the Exodus and the Conquest, 
which motivated the excavations at Et-Tell, is pointless.  Unsurprisingly, "the 
problem of Ai" is no longer part of the mainstream scholarly discourse. It continues, 
however, to occupy some groups of dedicated scholars, as discussed in the next 
section.  
12.  Where is Ay (again)? The uncompromising savants 
Several scholars rejected the mainstream opinions described above, offering 
radically different hypotheses about the biblical Ai and calling into question widely 
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held background assumptions. This section outlines two of the more prominent 
versions of this thinking.  
 The hypotheses discussed below differ in several respects, but they have two things 
in common:  Both embrace an "early" hypothesis for the time of the Exodus and the 
conquest of Canaan by the Israelite (A4), and both reject the identification of Et-Tell 
with the biblical Ai. In these respects, therefore, they re-open issues that were 
assumed to have been satisfactorily answered.   
The first hypothesis was formulated by Professor (from Tel-Aviv University) Joshua 
Meir Grintz (1947, 1961) and repeated by Yoel Elitzur (1980, 2014). The reasoning in 
all these articles is identical (except for one small but significant difference, 
mentioned below), so I shall discuss them using Grintz 1961, which is the only one 
published in English.  
After an elegant review of the prior deliberations about the location of Biblical Ai 
(A1, A3) Grintz criticises and rejects all the arguments that led people to identify it 
with Et-Tell:  (1) the geographical and topographical correlation with the biblical 
descriptions is "possible but not binding" – other locations in the vicinity that were 
suggested as alternatives have a similar or even better correlation; (2) the 
toponymic/onomastic argument is simply false:  He points to several locations in 
modern Palestine that bear the Arabic name "Et-Tell" in (208) and to several 
different places named "Ai" in the Bible (211). Besides, "It is … abundantly clear that 
the word Ai does not serve as the designation of a ruin…  it means pile, a heap of 
stones…."33; and (3) as for the archaeological results "The contradiction is really a 
complete one, being between the excavations and the Bible as a whole." 
The last point is the crucial one:  Grintz postulated biblical Ai to be not only the place 
of Abrahams's altar (Gen 12:8) and Joshua's battle (Josh. 7-8), but also of pre-exilic 
                                                           
33 Zevit (1983) accepted Grintz position against the onomastic identification "Ai = Et-Tell", adding 
some arguments of his own. He rejected, however.  Grintz' geographical analysis and insisted on the 
identification of Et-Tell with the biblical Ai as the only possible one.   
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places with the similar names: Aiyah  (1 Chr 7:20) and  Aiyath (Ish. 10:20), and the 
post-exilic Ai (Ez. 2: 28, Neh. 11:31). Other scholars (though not all of them) have 
made similar identifications. Grintz, however, combined this list of biblical references 
with the early-exodus chronological framework, which he endorsed, to derive a 
surprising result.  If indeed the Patriarchs lived in the eighteenth and the conquest of 
Canaan occurred in the fourteenth or fifteenth century B.C. then it turns out that 
"upon the destruction of Et-Tell, Ai was settled... and upon the destruction of Ai, Et-
Tell was settled" (207). The archaeological evidence from Et-Tell, therefore, rather 
than challenging the biblical narrative, proves that Et-Tell cannot be the site of 
biblical Ai!  
Similar considerations enabled Grintz to suggest that Et-Tell is, in fact, the location of 
biblical Beth-Aven.  As for the location of ancient Ai, both Grintz (216) and Elitzur 
suggested that it must be somewhere close to Et-Tell (given that Ai is "near Bet-
Aven," Josh 7:2). But here there is a difference: Grintz pointed to Khirbet Haiyan as 
an interesting, though yet unconfirmed possibility that should be explored by 
excavation. Elitzur (2014:29), speaking after Callaway's excavations which ruled out 
the place as well as all previously suggested Ai-alternatives, said more obliquely that 
"it is likely that the ruins of Ai can simply be found in a section of et-Tell not yet 
excavated, perhaps buried beneath part of the adjacent town of Deir Dibwan." 
Recognizing that the site had been surveyed before, he hastens to add: "It is critical 
to stress that the mere lack of archaeological evidence for this claim is no proof of its 
illegitimacy.  Many important sites appear completely innocuous … before they are 
excavated." 
A different and more radical hypothesis was offered by David Livingston  (1970, 
1989, 1994, 2003) and John Bimson (Bimson and Livingston 1987).  
The Livingston - Bimson proposal consists of (1) rejecting the identification of Bethel 
with Beitin, proposing the town El-Bireh instead as the site of biblical Bethel; (2) 
Identifying Khirbet Nisya, a small site about one mile southeast of El-Bireh, as the 
likely place for biblical Ai (see map in Fig.2);  (3) adopting an early (fifteenth century 
B.C.) date for the Exodus and the time of entry of Israel into Canaan; (4) suggesting 
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that the date for the end of the period designate by archaeoogists as the Middle 
Bronze II should be moved by over a century, from around 1550 B.C. to around 1420 
B.C. (The last idea, arguably the most audacious one, is only alluded to in Livingston 
1970 [p. 44] but is fully developed in Bimson and Livingston [1987: 8-9]). 
Discussing these ideas in full, and the replies to them (e.g., in Halpern 1987) would 
take me far beyond the scope of this work. What is important to understand is that 
the elements of the hypothesis are intertwined. The fifteenth-century Exodus 
scenario, combined with the suggestion to lower the date of Middle Bronze II by a 
century, enables Bimson and Livingston to show that Canaanite cities mentioned in 
the book of Joshua (e.g., Arad and Horma) were inhabited before the conquest and 
destroyed after it. As for Bethel, remember that it was the destruction layer in Beitin 
that sealed for Albright (and many that followed him) a thirteenth-century B.C. time-
frame for the conquest (A9). But if it can be demonstrated that Beitin is not, in fact, 
the site of biblical Bethel, this argument is called into question.  
Livingston notes that the challenge posed by Ai to their preferred historiography is 
particularly grave:  "There is textual evidence for the burning of only three cities by 
Joshua: Jericho (Josh. 6:24), Ai (Josh. 8:28), and Hazor (Josh. 11:13)." Jericho and 
Hazor have evidence for a Middle-Bronze conquest (Hazor also for a Late-Bronze 
one), so "The only exception seems to be Ai. … But we believe we have a solution to 
this anomaly. …. In our view, the site of Ai has been misidentified." (Bimson and 
Livingston 1987:10).  
To move Ai, while adhering to the biblical descriptions, one needs to move Bethel. 
Livingston offers a potpourri of arguments why ancient Bethel could not have been 
in Beitin: The dimensions of the site do not fit for what should have been a border 
town between the tribes of Ephraim and Benjamin; a place that is mentioned so 
many times in the Bible should have been "a living town," but Arab Beitin is "a dead 
town today"; the failure to find a vestige of Jeroboam's idolatry temple is "evidence 
from silence" against Beitin; the linguistic etymology Beitin = Beitil = Bethel is not 
valid, etc. Livingston's main argument, however, concerns the interpretation of the 
relevant passages in the fourth-century A.D books by Eusebius and Jerome (A1). 
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Both report that Bethel is located about twelve Roman miles from Ailia (Jerusalem), 
on the route to Neapolis (Shechem).  By Livingston's reckoning, Beitin does not fit 
this specification (it is too far) while El-Bireh does—provided one measures the 
distance from the Muristan square inside the Old City of Jerusalem and not, as 
commonly thought, from the pillar that stood inside the present-day Damascus Gate.  
Assuming the identification of El-Bireh with ancient Bethel, Bimson and Livingston 
offer arguments why Khirbet Nisya is, topographically speaking, an ideal candidate 
for the site of ancient Ai (Livingston 2003. cf. also the map in Fig.2).  
These arguments were discussed and rejected, one by one, by Rainey (1971, 1980, 
1988; cf. also Rainey 2006). He showed, for example, that when Eusebius mentioned 
distances to locales along the Jerusalem-Neapolis road, he usually reported them to 
the turnoffs from the main road (and therefore his description fits Beitin), and that 
these distances were measured from the city center (making a fit to El-Bireh 
impossible). Livingston's other arguments are similarly misleading. In short: "If Bethel 
is not Beitin, then there is no historical geography in the Bible."  (Rainy 1988). 
Himself a graduate of a theological seminary like Livingston and Bimson, Rainy 
sympathized with their desire to find "a solution to the problem of Ai" (1971:188), 
but he would have none of what, in his view, "could hardly be reckoned as a serious 
scholarship" (1980:251). Livingston and Bimson, however, remained unconvinced.  
Livingston conducted about a dozen excavations seasons at Khirbet Nisya 
(excavating at the densely built El-Bireh is out of the question). He reported the 
results in a book (Livingston 2003. For all I know, they were not published in a peer-
reviewed archaeological journal). The main result is that 
Excavations at Khirbet Nisya have shown that the site was occupied during 
the biblical periods when Ai was in existence. Periods of significant 
occupation, determined by ceramics, artifacts, and architectural evidence 
are: Middle Bronze II, Late Bronze I, some Late Bronze lIB, Iron Age I and II, 
Persian, Hellenistic, Early Roman, Byzantine and Early Islamic (Livingston 
2003: 213). 
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No traces of architecture from the Middle and Late Bronze Age or the early Iron Age 
were found, a fact that Livingston attributed to obliteration by later human activities.  
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Fig. 1   Maps of the PEF Western Palestine Survey, by C. R. Conder and H. H. 
Kitchener, 1879. 
Above: Map No. 14 (Beitin); Below: Map No. 17 (Jerusalem). Green rectangles mark 
the area included in the enlarged map below (Fig. 2).  
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Fig. 2: All the Ai – alternatives. An enlarged section combined from maps No. 14 and 
17 
1 – Beitin (Bethel), 2 – Deir Diwan, 3 – Et-Tell ("Tell el-Hajar), 4 – Khirbet  Haiyan, 5- 
Khirbet Kydrya, 6- Khirbet el-Hai   (Sections A1, A3, and A10). 
A – El-Bireh, B- Khirbet Nysia   (Section A12) 
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Division B: Epistemological considerations  
Neither these data nor the evidential claims based on them constitute a self-
warranting empirical foundation, and yet they can powerfully challenge and 
constrain the reconstructive and explanatory claims we project onto the cultural 
past. This is the paradox of material evidence. 
Chapman and Wylie 2016 
Coherence alone is not a symptom of truth, but maintaining coherence in light of 
more evidence, independent evidence, is. 
Kosso 2001 
Well, do historical scientists aim for truth? Sometimes—but they provide much more 
than a bunch of approximately true claims. They also promote understanding of the 
processes that shape our world, explanations of past histories, lessons for our own 
present and future. 
Currie 2018 
A recap, three notations, and the general theme:   
In this part, I discuss several epistemological issues that are raised by the episodes 
described in the former one.  
First, a short reminder; the protracted story in the previous pages can be 
summarized as follows:  
 The story of Ai in Josh. 7-8 was long regarded as central to Canaan's conquest 
by the Israelite tribes. Searches of many scholars resulted in four alternatives 
for the site of the biblical episodes (A1). Since the early 1920s, the mound of 
Et-Tell was generally believed to be the site of this event and it was expected 
that its excavation would resolve the "time of Exodus" dispute (A4). 
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 From the analysis of the sherds and vessels found in her 1933-1935 
excavation, Marquet-Krause concluded that the site was inhabited during the 
Early Bronze Age and the early Iron Age, but not during the intervening 
centuries (A6).  I shall refer to this conclusion as the Local Chronological 
Inference or the LCI.  
 This result was surprising, especially since it contradicted the opinion of two 
distinguished archaeologists who had examined the site before. Marquet-
Krause's conclusion that the Ai story must, therefore, be legendary—the 
Local Historiographic Inference (LHI)—was revolutionary, and, for many of 
her colleagues also deeply disturbing on both theoretical and ideological 
grounds (A8).  
 Nevertheless, both the chronological result and the inferred conclusion were 
quickly and unanimously accepted (A9). Scholars who were committed to the 
conquest hypothesis modified their accounts, usually describing the Ai story 
as an exception to the generally correct, even if not fully accurate, biblical 
report. 
 Callaway's excavations in the 1960s (A10) verified Marquet-Krause's 
chronological scheme, and also eliminated all "Ai alternatives" suggested 
before (A1), making the inference from the LCI to the LHI very robust.  
 Total abandonment of the conquest hypothesis came much later, 
concomitant with further discoveries that conflicted with it (A11).  A 
widespread consensus now considers the book of Joshua wholly or mostly 
legendary, with the Ai story an example of the rule rather than an exception. I 
shall call this view the Global Historiographic Inference, or the GHI. 
 A minority of scholars rejects the current consensus (A12), offering 
alternatives to both the identification of Et-Tell with biblical Ai (thus rejecting 
the LHI while accepting the LCI) and to the commonly accepted account of 
the Bronze and the Iron Ages in the Levant (rejecting, in particular, the GHI).  
49  
 
Because the three acronyms LCI, LHI and GHI are going to appear repeatedly in the 
following discussions, it is worth spelling them out again: 
- The LCI (local chronological inference): The statement that the mound of Et-
Tell was uninhabited during the Middle and Late Bronze Age (in modern 
chronological schemes, approximately from 2200 B.C. until at least 1300 B.C).  
This is, obviously, an essentially archaeological inference. 
- The LHI (local historical inference): The statement that the biblical Ai story is 
legendary. Identification of Et-Tell as the only suitable location for this story 
(plus any estimation ever offered for its possible time) in conjunction with 
the LCI entails the LHI.   
- The GHI (global historical inference): The statement that the content of the 
book Joshua is mostly or wholly legendary.  
This part of the treatise is structured as follows: The first three sections discuss what 
can support hypotheses about the past; the first two concentrate on the LCI and the 
third considers historiographic hypotheses in general. Section four compares the 
acceptance of the GHI to the Kuhnian conception of scientific revolutions; section 
five is about inference from absence. Sections six and seven examine how the 
epistemic opinions of scientists can be influenced by their personal and ideological 
values. The eighth and last section is an argument for the truth of the LCI.   
That a complicated and (initially) unexpected inference such as the LCI can be (and, 
given all that we know, must be) true, in the sense of correspondence truth, is, I 
submit, a principal outcome of this work. Briefly stated, the truth-claim is based (B8) 
upon (1) the notion that something must be true about the occupancy of the mound 
at any time of the past and (2) the observation that this inference is the only 
coherent interpretation of a vast and very diverse amount of data.  
Another principal point (B7) is that it is the relative prioritization of values that 
determines  scientists' receptiveness to disruptive results and inferences. This case 
study provides polarized examples of scientists' values and their influences on their 
epistemic stances. 
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In light of these two points, the current work can be taken as a plea against 
relativistic construals of knowledge, in archaeology, historiography, and elsewhere.  
1. Typology as knowledge 34  
Marquet-Krause's dramatic chronological conclusion—the LCI—was based entirely 
on typology: the classification of pottery into types and the assignment of these 
types to specific periods. The nature of the site dictated that stratigraphy, the other 
common basis of archaeological reasoning, played no role (except for the trivial 
observation that the Iron Age structures were above the deep ash layer).35 Other 
methods of chronological determination, like radiocarbon dating, were not even 
imagined at the time.  
The concept of typology, as M. Salmon (1993: 327) observed, is pivotal to every 
philosophical discussion of archaeology. Archaeologists and philosophers argued a 
lot, in what became known as "The Typology Debate," over the epistemic and 
ontological status of archaeological types and classificatory systems, and in 
particular whether they are "real and discovered" or "artificial and invented" 
(Dunnell 1986; Adams and Adams 1991: 33, 239; Wylie 2002: 42-56). 
None of these issues bothered the scholars who created and used the Middle 
Eastern ceramic typology during the 1920s and the 1930s. Working in what Adams 
and Adams call "the classificatory era," their approach to the matter of classification 
was entirely practical: creating a framework that will support a temporal, spatial and, 
in some cases, ethnical or societal assignment of sites and layers.36 
                                                           
34  The argument in this section applies, mutatis mutandis, to other sources of archaeological 
knowledge. I focus on typology because it played a crucial role in this case. In this section and the next 
I confine myself, furthermore, to what enabled typology to support the LCI. These sections, therefore, 
should by no means be taken as a treatise on the philosophy of typology or anything similar. See also 
footnote #7 in (A2). 
35 Stratigraphy was involved in the excavator's suggestion for the sub-division of the Early-Bronze 
city's lifespan, which does not concern us here.  
36 To a large extent, the same holds today: Conceptual debates about the essence of archaeology etc. 
that occupied the thinking of many scholars in Europe and (especially) in the United States, had and 
continue to have only minor influence in the context of biblical and Middle-Eastern archaeology.  
Discussing why it is so is beyond the scope of this work, but one can point out that "theories that led 
where practice could not follow" (Adams and Adams 311) were usually eschewed there.   
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How could archaeological typology, pragmatically understood, support such a far-
reaching chronological and historiographic inference? 
"Pragmatic" by no means equals "trivial." People who are not archaeologists are 
usually baffled by the intricacies of classifying and sorting sherds and other artifacts. 
Finkelstein's critique of Callaway (A10) and Albright's withdrawal of his conclusions 
that were derived from "examining thousands of sherds" at Et-Tell (A9) show that 
the task can be tricky even for seasoned archaeologists. As Shepard (1956: 315-6) 
warned:  
In any event, I would emphasize that the condition of the average pottery 
sample and particularly the incompleteness of stylistic data make of the 
pottery type a tentative, hypothetical class to be re-examined, corrected, and 
amplified from time to time as evidence accumulates; a class that may spill or 
combined with another, redefined, or discarded. It is a category in the 
process of formulation instead of a fixed standard of reference.  
 The ambiguity of types is not the only problem of archaeological typography. Add to 
this the problems of interpersonal differences in recognizing and describing patterns 
(Harding 1999: 193), of post-depositional processes that can separate between 
artifacts and their original contexts (Orton and Hughes 2013: 222), and in particular 
the theory-ladenness of every premise and the danger of circularity, namely of 
assigning ceramic types to a certain period and then using those types as a 
diagnostic marker for that period (ibid, 226; see also the next section B2).  It would 
appear that any inference based solely or mainly on archaeological typology should 
be regarded with reservations. 
And yet, Marquet-Krause's LCI was not met with reservations. Its robustness is 
demonstrated by the fact that it was accepted by many scholars of diverse 
backgrounds over many decades. Among these scholars, many found its 
historiographic implications deeply disturbing and would have personal, institutional, 
theoretical, and ideological motivation to refute it, but none saw it expedient to 
reject it. Notably, even scholars who rejected both the LHI and the GLI (A12) 
accepted the LCI and the reasoning behind it.  
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This is not a unique, one-of-a-kind case, but just one example of what Chapman and 
Wylie (2016: 4) call "the paradox of material evidence": 
Neither these data nor the evidential claims based on them constitute a self-
warranting empirical foundation, and yet they can powerfully challenge and 
constrain the reconstructive and explanatory claims we project onto the 
cultural past. This is the paradox of material evidence: that ‘traces don’t 
speak.’ Material evidence is inescapably an interpretive construct; what it 
‘says’ is contingent on the provisional scaffolding we bring to bear. And yet it 
has a striking capacity to function as a ‘network of resistances to theoretical 
appropriation’ that routinely destabilizes settled assumptions, redirects 
inquiry and expands interpretive horizons in directions no one had 
anticipated. 
An even greater paradox, I argue, arises when challenging interpretations that are 
based on such a questionable foundation are consensually accepted as veridical.  
 Tucker (2004, Ch. 1) maintains that the existence of such a consensus indicates that 
the inference is knowledge-based: 
…heterogeneous uncoerced and large consensus on historiographic beliefs is 
a likely indicator of knowledge [since]… if a consensus on beliefs satisfies… 
[these] three conditions, the gap between the likelihood of the consensus 
given the knowledge hypothesis and its likelihoods given competing 
hypotheses increases significantly. 
A necessary qualification: Note that this construal does not imply that the consensus 
in question is immutable or infallible. Even an uncoerced, extensive and 
heterogeneous scientific consensus is not an imprimatur of truth. But it does 
indicate—makes it very likely—that the consensually shared opinion is informed in a 
rational manner by the available empirical facts, since it is implausible that such a 
consensus would have accidentally materialized otherwise. It is in this sense—as an 
indication of rationality rather than as an assertion of a necessary truth—that I shall 
use the term "knowledge" from now on. (The truth-aptness of a particular inference 
is discussed in B8 below.) 
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The relevant knowledge, in our case, is that of determining the age of material 
artifacts. The possibility of creating a reasonably stable consensus on this matter is, 
as explained above, far from self-evident. Indeed, heated debates often occur that 
are resolved only after many decades, if at all. But in many cases, a consensus on 
typological classification and its chronological implications does emerge. Somewhat 
paradoxically, I submit, such consensuses are enabled and maintained exactly by the 
"dirty" and fragmentary nature of material evidence. 
The extended course of events described in the first division can be used to highlight 
several crucial aspects of such processes:  
  Knowledge creation: The interludes in sections A2, A5, and A7  discussed aspects of 
the creation and development of the Palestinian ceramic typology, from the nearly 
blank state at the end of the nineteenth century to a corpus of knowledge stable 
enough that Callaway's conclusions in the 1960s reproduced Market-Krause's from 
the 1930s. These aspects included: making coarse initial assumptions, looking for 
chronological anchors, heavy reliance on parallels from other sites, creating 
hypotheses, and, most importantly, constant development and refinement of both 
the typology and the chronological schemes with an aim of achieving a coherent 
spatial-temporal framework.   
Similar strategies characterize other processes of knowledge creation. In his 
description and analysis of the development of thermometry, Chang (2004) says that 
science uses "a method of epistemic iterations" in which  
…we start by adopting an existing system of knowledge, with some respect 
for it but without any firm assurance that it is correct; on the basis of that 
initially affirmed system we launch inquiries that result in the refinement and 
even correction of the original system. (6) 
[Such] epistemic iteration is most likely a process of creative evolution; in 
each step, the later stage is based on the earlier stage, but cannot be 
deduced from it in any straightforward sense. Each link is based on the 
principle of respect, and the imperative of progress and the whole chain 
exhibits innovative progress within a continuous tradition. (46)  
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Speaking specifically about material evidence in archaeology, Chapman and Wylie 
(2016) use Toulmin's metaphor of scaffolding to describe a similar concept.37 
Scaffolding involves opportunistically applying various resources: "ladening theory, 
background knowledge (tacit and explicit), technical skills, social networks, 
institutional infrastructure and vigilant reflexive critique" both for making the 
archaeological observations possible and for deriving evidential claims from them. 
The scaffolding process, too, is iterative: "Archaeologists are engaged in a dynamic 
process of continuously building, extending, and refining provisional foundations." 
There were, as we saw, quite a few faux pas.  Many of the initial assumptions—e.g., 
Petrie's Amorite/Israelite chronology or the (widely diverging) estimations of the 
date of Jericho's walls by various archaeologists—were later revised, sometimes 
profoundly.   Whole typological frameworks (for example, the dating of Philistine 
pottery) were revised several times. Nevertheless, the historical account in division A 
provides ample illustration of the manner in which successive iterations, scaffolding 
and re-scaffolding, create, revise, and expand a body of knowledge. The iterative 
nature of the process is, I believe, evident enough. What is important to note is that 
it also had a property of convergence, in the sense that as knowledge accumulated it 
also constrained, more and more, the gamut of possible interpretations.  
For example, when Albright (A3) together with colleagues from the American School 
combed the surface of Et-Tell, knowledge gathered from excavations in Ashkelon 
and other sites enabled him to conclude "almost to his consternation" that the lack 
of certain types of sherds, such as Phoenician and  Cypriote ware, is a strong 
evidence-from-absence against a Late Bronze occupation on the site. He failed, 
however, to discern between Middle-Bronze and Early-Bronze ware.  When 
Marquet-Krause came there ten years later (A6), inputs that were added by other 
excavations created an interwoven web of data "thick" enough to constrain further 
the possible interpretations of the site's chronology. She was thus able to conclude 
that the site did not reach even the beginning of the Middle Bronze Age, effectively 
increasing the resolution of relative dating from ca. five to one hundred years.  
                                                           
37 Currie (2018: Ch. 10) applies a similar concept of "scaffolding" to the generation of historical 
knowledge in general.  
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  Stability of knowledge: As Currie (2017) notes, it is not clear if Chapman and Wylie's 
scaffolding concept allows for a "completed product" in archaeology. All knowledge, 
indeed, is tentative and fallible.  
Such stability is, of course, not guaranteed.  Not only is knowledge (in the sense used 
here) not immutable, but it is also liable to deteriorate when the process of 
iterations and refinement cease. A vivid (and distressing) example is given by 
Albright's critique (also echoed by Moorey 1991:61) of Petrie's later works in 
Palestine: 
Petrie's absolute dates, being based on a scarab of Tuthmosis ΙI and a 
calculation of the relative rate of deposit of debris on the mound, are 
worthless before 900 B. C. He carefully disregards all archaeological work 
done in Palestine since his own first excavations at Teil el-Hesi in 1890. 
(1929a: 9, 2n) 
  Limitations of knowledge creation: Marquet-Krause could point to significant and 
sometimes surprising aspects of Et-Tell chronology. She did not attempt, however, to 
say anything about the cognitive and spiritual world of the people who lived in the 
city and worshipped in its sanctuaries. Excavating the city's necropolis, she noted 
that one of the skeletons held a small decorated amphora in its palm "which might 
have a significance that eludes us" (1935:343).  Had she tried to opine on these 
matters (or had anybody used her data for this purpose) the outcome would have 
                                                           
38 This resonates with Chang's (2004: 52) observation that mid–level regularities are often robust 
enough to be decoupled from changes in grand theories.   
—involve a revision of the LCI and the classification scheme that underlies it.38  This 
suggests that under some circumstances the repeated scaffolding process can result 
in knowledge that is very stable. 
It is a fact, though, that the LCI remained unchanged despite the vast increase in the 
amount of data and the substantial development of inferential tools in the eighty 
years since it was first published. Nor did the watershed changes in the general 
understanding of the Bronze-Age transition in Palestine—from the Conquest to the 
Peaceful Immigration to the Autochthonic scenario (Wallach 2018, 2019a)
56  
 
been much less stable, much more underdetermined than her chronological scheme. 
The ability to infer from material remains to cognitive stances is very limited.   
But the obstacles to our knowledge of the past are not confined to questions of 
human beliefs and cognitions; depending upon the evidentiary status, even more 
mundane inferences may be unwarranted. We do not know (the suggestions of 
Dussaud (A9) and Grintz (A12) notwithstanding) the name of the ancient city and 
who destroyed it, and probably never will. Adams et al. (1979) show that a close 
connection between dated pottery types and historical development cannot be 
taken for granted. In fact, more than a century of biblical archaeology failed to 
provide a clear answer to the question of the "origin of Israel." Even more 
inherently, all archaeological dating methods, whether by typology or by modern 
methods such as radiometry, have a finite resolution which means that some 
intriguing questions cannot be answered definitively.  
It does not follow that such subjects are not amenable to a historiographic 
investigation that is informed by archaeological evidence. However, when the 
material evidence or our ability to interpret it is limited, archaeological reasoning is 
more akin to what Chapman and Wylie, following Bradley, call "ways of seeing" 
(2016: 42). Whether such a pluralistic landscape of hermeneutically supported views 
can also be interpreted as an indication of knowledge is a question that is beyond 
the scope of this work. (cf. also Tucker 2004 Ch. 6 about the limits of historiographic 
knowledge.)  
2. The risk of circularity 
All observations are theory-laden, and all interpretation is liable to be biased by prior 
assumptions. An archeologist's interpretations of material evidence are likely to be 
influenced by her theoretical assumptions, including her preferred historiographic 
framework. This theory-ladenness can lead to circularity when the interpretation of 
archaeological findings depends on hypotheses that the same traces are said to 
support.  
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For an example of archaeological interpretation engendering circularity, consider 
Albright's (1935: 13) discussion of results from British excavations at Tell ed-Duweir 
(ancient Lachish): 
There can be no doubt about the competence of Mr. Starkey and Mr. Harding 
in matters of pottery, but one may be permitted to doubt whether the 
absolute dates are entirely correct, since the writer has had occasion before 
to note a divergence of from thirty to fifty years in the average chronology of 
the thirteenth and  the twelveth centuries in our publications … A date in the 
second half of the reign of Ramesses II seems, therefore, more probable than 
one in the first half.  
Albright's reliance on his own chronological scheme to criticize Starkey's conflicting 
one is clearly problematic. But much more was at stake here: Ramesses II "The 
Great" reigned 66 years.  The famous "Israel stele" of his successor Merneptah was 
understood as providing a crucial chronological anchor for the early years of the 
Israelite conquest of Canaan (A4).  A much earlier date for the last material remains 
from Canaanite Lachish (as suggested by Starkey) would, therefore, challenge a 
scenario in which Albright (and many others) strongly believed at the time. 
The risk of circularity is not peculiar to archaeology. Discussing the physics of 
calorimetry, Chang (2004: 59-60) observed that:  
Whenever we have a method of measurement that rests on an empirical law, 
we have the same kind of problem in testing and justifying that law. This 
circularity is probably the most crippling form of the theory-ladenness of 
observation. 
Whether because of it's hands-on, readily accessible nature or for other reasons the 
problem of circularity (and of theory-ladenness in general) is often mentioned in 
connection with archaeological results and their interpretation: 
If the data stand as evidence only under interpretation, could they not be 
interpreted in any number of different ways, and thus support a myriad of 
alternative reconstructive and explanatory hypotheses? Even more 
worrisome, does this contextualism not entail that inferences concerning the 
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past are unavoidably circular, that archaeologists will necessarily find in the 
record just, or only, what their conceptual framework prepares them to 
recognize as evidence? (Wylie 1993: 22) 
Some archeologists have concluded that circularity in archaeological interpretation is 
inevitable and incurable: 
We must reject any naive distinction between the object conceived as 
concrete hard fact and theories or ideas about it conceived as abstract. 
Theory works on empirical objects which are theorized, brought into the 
account, through the subject-object reflexive relationship … There is literally 
nothing independent of theory or propositions to test against. Any test could 
only result in a tautology. (Shanks and Tilley 1987:111). 
Chang's solution to the problem of circularity is, surprisingly, to accept it and try to 
"tighten" it through successive epistemic iterations 
The only productive way of dealing with that circularity is to accept it and 
admit that justification in empirical science has to be coherentist. Within such 
coherentism, epistemic iteration provides an effective method of scientific 
progress, resulting in the enrichment and self-correction of the initially 
affirmed system. This mode of scientific progress embraces both 
conservatism and pluralism at once. (2004: 239) 
Chapman and Wylie (2017: 28) advocate a more nuanced and balanced attitude: Not 
every instance of theory-ladenness must lead to circularity, and not every shade of 
circularity invalidates the archaeological inference: 
The second intuition implicit in practice is that the theory-dependence of 
archaeological evidence does not in any necessary or comprehensive sense 
entail vicious circularity. The background knowledge, assumptions, and 
expectations that play a role in interpreting data as evidence – the ‘ladening’ 
theory – only pre-determine what archaeologists will find or recognize as 
evidence if there is a hyper-integration of inferential warrants and test 
hypotheses. That is, a compromising circularity only follows if the middle-
range theory that archaeologists rely on to interpret data as evidence is the 
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same as, or presupposes, the hypothesis this evidence is used to support or 
to test. This is, of course, always a risk, but it is not a given.  
The key to avoiding vicious circularity is, then, to assure independence between the 
information used as evidence and the theory or hypothesis that information is said 
to be evidencing.39 Inferences based on archaeological data can be made reasonably 
non-circular (and also correctable, or "tightable" sensu Chang) if they are connected 
to diverse and reasonably independent sources of data such as different sites and 
strata, foreign chronology, radiometric dating, etc.    
A similar idea, in somewhat more technical terms, is outlined by Kosso (1989:183): 
It is a likely fact of life that some part of the theory-of-x will be used to 
account for the observation of some aspect of a particular x.  But a degree of 
independence is preserved if this is not a crucial part of the theory, the part 
which explicitly discusses that aspect of x which has putatively been 
observed, the part which could, therefore, benefit (by confirmation) from the 
observation.  In relying on the relationship between TX1and TX2 and the 
relationship between TX2 and {T}, this characterization of independence of 
an account potentially admits of degrees.   
Independence, then, comes in degrees and, ipso facto, the same (counterintuitively, 
perhaps) holds for circularity. The more contingent upon the theory being tested an 
interpretation of evidence is, the more vicious is the circularity of the reasoning. 
Albright's objection to Starkey's dating of Lachish stratum VI, cited above, is tainted 
with a non-negligible degree of circularity because it relied crucially on a 
historiographic hypothesis that this dating challenged.  
Chang, however, dismisses both the possibility and the necessity of independence:  
What is certain is that there is no guarantee that observations enabled by a 
particular theory will always validate that theory…  Therefore there is no 
clear reason to wish for theory-neutral observations or seek what Peter 
                                                           
39 Wylie (2002: 192) distinguished between two kinds of independence:  That of background 
assumption from test hypotheses ("vertical") and that between the assumptions used in the 
interpretation of different sources of evidence (horizontal).  
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Kosso (1988, 1989) calls ‘‘independence’’ between the theory of the 
instrument and the theory to be tested by the observation produced by the 
instrument. Even in the case of positive test-outcomes, the comfort provided 
by independence is illusory. Duhem’s physiologist relying on the laws of 
physics can be comforted only as far as those laws of physics are reliable.40  
(2004: 95) 
I think Chang is wrong here. For one thing, he ignores Kosso's observation (which 
Chapman and Wylie implicitly share) that independence is a matter of degree.41 
Consider, for example, the important topic of providing "anchors"42 to the 
archaeologists' chronology. At the period discussed here, absolute chronologies 
were derived from artifacts of Egyptian origin such as cartouches, hieroglyphic or 
hieratic inscriptions referring to Pharaohs. Interludes A2 and A5  in the previous 
division show how crucial these were for stabilizing the "scaffolding" of the 
Palestinian typology and through it the security of inferences like the Market-
Krause's LCI and LHI.  
Chang would perhaps say that these "anchors" and inferences based on them were 
as good as was the chronology of ancient Egypt at the time. He could add that this 
chronology was established by methodologies of stratigraphy, typology, seriation, 
etc., which were similar to those used by archaeologists in Palestine and thus, 
potentially, subject to common errors. However, what matters is that the 
determination of Egyptian chronology did not rely on theories about the archaeology 
and history of Palestine. At the very least this makes such determination less circular 
than otherwise.  Inferences that depended not on absolute but on relative Egyptian 
                                                           
40  Duhem said that theories in physics can only be tested holistically, among other things because 
test instruments are designed according to physical theories, but physicians can rely on similar 
instruments since such theories are not part of their reasoning.  
41 This difference of opinion between Kosso and Chang may be related to their different concept of 
truth: Kosso speaks in terms of truth of descriptions of the past, so that "a true description is one that 
matched the determinate state of affair" and "coherence alone is not a symptom of truth, but 
maintaining coherence in light of more evidence, independent evidence, is" (1989: 182). Chang (2004: 
228) thinks that truth is inappropriate as an epistemic goal, or (2018: 33) is willing to endorse a notion 
of truth that "is a matter of degree and circumstances". See (B8) for my own view about the relation 
between truth and coherence. 
42  "External evidence" in Adams and Adams' terminology (1991: 122).  
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chronology (i.e., the order of Pharaohs and lengths of their reign) were even less 
circular since this relative chronology was also supported by textual and epigraphic 
evidence, whose interpretation normally does not depend upon archaeological 
methods.  
Second, recalcitrant evidence has the power to constrain the space of possible 
interpretations, sometimes to the point of making historiographic hypotheses 
completely untenable and thus breaking a chain of circularity. To return to the 
example mentioned in the beginning of this section, when later excavations at 
Lachish exposed a cartouche containing  the name of Ramesses III (Ussishkin 
1987:13) below the destruction debris of the last Canaanite city, no option remained 
to preserve a thirteenth-century B.C. conquest scenario (in either Albright's or 
Starkey's version) for the site.43   
3. Appraising historiographic hypotheses: Consilience, Coherence or 
"Smoking Guns"? 
Sciences of the past, including archaeology, seek to account for present 
circumstances by postulating past events, processes, and state-of-affairs. Often, 
several plausible hypotheses are offered to explain a given assemblage of traces. If, 
as in our case here, a "winner" is selected by the relevant scientific community, how 
is this selection made? Which "game rules" influence it? 
Cleland (2002, 2011) suggested that discrimination between competing hypotheses 
in the historical sciences can be achieved using "smoking gun" evidence. A smoking 
gun is a (previously unexpected) trace that unambiguously discriminates one 
hypothesis about the past because this hypothesis, but not others, provides an 
explanation of the total body of evidence including the newly-discovered trace(s).44   
                                                           
43 Thirty years separate the death of Ramesses II from the beginning of Ramesses III thirty-one-year 
reign.  
44 Cleland (probably in response to criticism by Forber & Griffith below) insisted that smoking gun 
evidence does not play the role of an experimentum crucis, conclusively determining between 
competing hypotheses. Rather, "a smoking gun for a hypothesis is a capstone piece of evidence; it can 
only be judged as a smoking gun when combined with the rest of the evidence available” (Cleland 
2013: 4;  cf. also Currie 2018:  235) 
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As its name implies, the discovery of a smoking gun has sociological and 
psychological dimensions:  "the more improbable an association among a collection 
of traces seems, the more psychologically appealing the claim that it is the product 
of a common cause." (2011:19). The discovery of smoking-gun evidence is not 
guaranteed, but Cleland maintained that it might be a fairly common affair, because 
in the world as we know it, a past cause will typically have extensive and diverse 
localized extant effects, while a present event or state-of-affairs normally have more 
than a single cause. This "asymmetry of overdetermination" (after Lewis 1979) 
warrants that "One can never rule out the possibility of finding a smoking gun, and 
this is a consequence of an objective fact about nature" (2002: 492). Jeffares (2008) 
further elaborated this idea by arguing that historical reasoning, including reasoning 
from smoking gun evidence, relies on the availability of regularities that "are testable 
and stable enough to work in the relevant circumstances." 
A smoking gun at Et-Tell?  Judging by the unexpectedness of their results and the 
effect they had, the results of Marquet-Krause excavations can be viewed as a typical 
case of a smoking gun.  Can we, therefore, label it as yet another example (besides 
the proverbial Cretaceous-Tertiary extinction and a few others) of Cleland's thesis?  
I think we should not, for two reasons: First, the excavation's results themselves 
were based upon archaeological (specifically, typological) reasoning which, as 
discussed above (B1, B2), was achieved through a painstaking iterative process with 
no possibility for smoking-gun shortcuts. Secondly, these results had proven 
insufficient in themselves to discredit the Conquest hypothesis in the eyes of most 
scholars (A9). Something more was needed (A11) for the GHI to be accepted.   
Cases of a true "smoking gun"—formerly unexpected pieces of evidence that (in 
combination with other data) speak decidedly for one hypothesis among several—
are rare in archaeology (and probably in other historical sciences as well). Albright's 
employment of potsherds' analysis to decide between several "Ai alternatives" (A3) 
had such an effect, but only because the hypotheses he debunked were at the time 
several generations old. The discovery of unmistakable evidence of Rameses III in 
Lachish, mentioned in the previous paragraph, or of an inscription referring to the 
"house of David" (Biran and Nave 1995) can also be a candidate. Scratching one's 
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head for examples brings to mind discoveries related to the global dispersion of 
hominins, such as the evidence for the Denisovans or a pre-Clovis human presence in 
America. The majority of archeological inferences, however, cannot appeal to such 
singular and conclusive supports.     
Forber and Griffith (2011) discounted both the plausibility and the importance of 
smoking gun evidence as posited by Cleland and Jeffares. Firstly, because time 
exposes the traces of past events to attrition and obliteration, "metaphysical 
overdetermination is compatible with epistemic underdetermination" (after Turner 
2005), and therefore we may never find extant traces that will have the power 
discriminate between competing hypotheses.  
Even more fundamentally, since the interpretation of empirical evidence depends on 
a host of auxiliary and background assumptions, even an argument that is based 
upon observation of telltale and surprising traces may still be underdetermined. A 
supporter of the Conquest hypothesis, for example, could accommodate the LHI 
while maintaining that an Israelite conquest of Canaan did take place by bracketing 
off the content of Josh. 7-8 as an etiological story (Albright), a grossly exaggerated 
report (Vincent) or just an exceptional legendary narrative (Yadin).  
Forber and Griffith maintain that strong epistemic support for historical claims is 
derived from the consilience of multiple independent lines of evidence concerning 
essential properties of the causal history proposed, rather than from improbable 
"smoking guns". The degree of consilience, as analyzed by them, depends on two 
factors. The first is the extent to which the various lines of inference constrain the 
assumed causal history and its various aspects (can we safely discard other 
explanations?) and is not very different from Cleland's "smoking gun" criterion. The 
second is the degree of independence between the auxiliary assumptions that are 
required to derive each inferential path from extant traces to past events (do we 
really have independent evidence or do they all depend on the same assumptions 
and may fail with them?).  Both Cleland and Forber and Griffith use the asteroid-
driven mass extinction at the Cretaceous-Paleogene boundary to illustrate their 
argument.  
64  
 
Currie (2016, 2018)45 noted that the difference between the approaches of Cleland 
and Forber & Griffith is not profound, since both are concerned with the relation 
between common-cause hypotheses about the past and extant traces, and because 
"smoking gun" arguments are often themselves based on ensembles of (consilient) 
evidence. Using case studies in paleontology for illustration, he argues for another 
(non-exclusive) methodology for generating and adjudicating hypotheses in the 
historical sciences: Testing for coherency between hypotheses about the past. For 
example, a hypothesis that gigantic sauropods were hot-blooded coheres with a 
hypothesis about their feeding strategies (maintaining endothermic metabolism 
requires consuming a lot of food), and both draw support from evidence about their 
dentition. A hypothesis that the glaciation in the last "snowball earth" episode was 
incomplete coheres with hypotheses that the later "Cambrian explosion" resulted 
from separated local refugia in this incomplete ice cover. Scientists exploit these 
dependencies by constructing interdependent explanations with coupled 
confirmation, which serve as "coherency tests."46  
Commenting on Currie, Wylie argued (in Chapman and Wylie 2016: 66 n14) that "this 
practice of reasoning from explanatory coherence, a practice that Currie sees as a 
distinctive (non-trace-centric) strategy, depends upon an appeal to the convergence 
of distinct lines of evidence which is a standard feature of trace-centric accounts."  
Archaeological reasoning: consilience-cum-coherence: I think Wylie's remark cited 
above captures much of what archeologists do when they attempt to offer an 
interpretation of theirs and other's results, or a reconstruction of the past based 
upon such interpretations. The overused "jigsaw-puzzle" metaphor for 
archaeological research, though not totally adequate, reflects this concept by 
invoking the ideas of "fitting together" elements of an unknown big picture and 
approaching this task from various directions.  
                                                           
45 In his last book, which appeared when this work was coming to a close, Adrian Currie (2018) 
presents an expanded version of this theory and applies it to historical reconstruction in general. As 
far as I can tell, my approach and conclusions here generally accords with his.  
46 Currie (2016: 16) insists that this position does not oblige him to a coherentist epistemology. I share 
this view (see B8). 
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And so it has been since the dawn of the discipline. Consider, for example, how 
Trigger's History of Archaeological Thought (2006) describes the very first steps in 
the development of archaeological typology (my italics): 
… all the characteristics of individual objects and of the objects found 
together in closed finds displayed coherent patterns with respect to material, 
style, decoration, and contexts of discovery … Thomsen’s47 crude but 
effective technique of occurrence sorting produced classificatory units that 
appeared unlikely to have coexisted and, therefore, most probably 
represented a chronological sequence. (p. 126) 
Because of the vastly greater amount of data available and Montelius’48 more 
detailed artifact classifications, it was possible for him not only to identify 
shorter periods but… to order these periods chronologically. For such a 
sequence to be persuasive, materials, techniques of manufacture, shape, and 
decoration had to covary in a coherent pattern. (p. 226) 
Usually (our case study is atypical in this respect) archaeological reasoning combines 
typology with stratigraphy. Often, other sources of information such as epigraphic, 
numismatic, remote sensing, and dates derived from dendrochronology or 
(increasingly in modern times) radiometric data are involved, and their combined 
result need be not only consilient—converging to the same conclusions—but also 
coherent. 
But what is coherence, anyway? It turns out to be a difficult concept to qualify, much 
less to quantify. Mere consistency is obviously not enough: If you believe, for 
example, that (a) Joshua won the battle of Jericho and (b) The rain in Spain stays 
mainly in the plain, this set of beliefs is consistent, but hardly coherent. The 
Cambridge dictionary defines coherence as "the situation when the parts of 
something fit together in a natural or reasonable way" (which again brings to mind 
the jigsaw-puzzle metaphor). The Oxford dictionary stresses "the quality of forming a 
                                                           
47 Christian Jürgensen Thomsen (Denmark, 1788-1825) was one of the first antiquarians to use 
typology in order to determine the age of past artifacts.  
48 Oskar Montelius (Sweden, 1843-1921) was arguably the first to use archaeological typography in a 
systematic and comprehensive manner. 
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Here is an example of coherence considerations shaping archaeological 
interpretation in a small way: Upon discovering a collection of stone and alabaster 
vessels in a context of Early Bronze Age III, Marquet-Krause (1935: 332-3, 1949:31 
[A6], [A7]) noted that they were une réplique exact of Egyptian artifacts from the 
time of the second dynasty, that is, Early Bronze II—a difference of more than two 
hundred years. Ruth Amiran (1970) had a better idea: These artifacts were not 
replicas, but a heritage, retained through generations because of their rarity and 
(possibly) sanctified status. This interpretation is more coherent because it posits 
something that people normally do, rather than a rare preservation of style and 
technique over hundreds of years, and is in harmony with a more general 
historiographic hypothesis—namely that the links between Egypt and Canaan were 
interrupted after the Early Bronze II period—that was perhaps not known to 
Marquet-Krause. A chemical or physical analysis of the material from which these 
vessels were made (a much later development) could add a consilient evidence of 
their provenance. 
More important than the exact definition of coherence is the requirement that it 
should be maintained over an extended time and against the challenge of additional 
data from multiple sources. In fact, one-time coherence is of no epistemic value at 
all:   
it is only in… the case in which the belief system converges on and eventually 
presents a relatively stable long-run picture of the world, thus achieving 
coherence over time … that the coherence of the system provides any strong 
reason for thinking that the component beliefs are thereby likely to be true. 
(BonJour 1985: 170). 
unified whole." Generally speaking, we expect that elements in a coherent set will be 
connected in some significant way. Scholars who tried to characterize the required 
connectedness stressed a casual (Carrol 2001: 37), explanatory (Kosso 2001: 75-6), 
or inferential (Kuukkanen 2015: Ch. 7) relationship, or merely the continuity of 
entities in space and time (Hull 1975). Depending on the particular context, each of 
these connecting schemes can serve as the "glue" of coherence. (cf. Wallach 2019a.) 
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Coherence is a necessary requirement of justification, but by itself it is not 
enough to separate good fiction from the truth. Add to it the need to 
encounter a steady supply of evidence, to acknowledge at least some of it as 
reliable and relevant, and to fit it into the existing coherent system, and it is 
less and less likely that the network of fiction will maintain its coherence. 
(Kosso 2001:182) 
Even though Petrie (A2) and Albright (A5) supported their analysis with diverse 
inferential lines that led to coherent conclusions (in their language, ones that "agree 
well"), many of these conclusions did not stand the test of time. In contrast, Joseph 
Callaway's excavations at Et-Tell reached, maybe against his hopes (A10), the same 
conclusions as did Marquet-Krause more than thirty years earlier. It is this stability 
against a deluge of artifacts, stratigraphic data, and repeated epistemic iterations 
(B1) that makes the LCI practically unassailable and the LHI practically unavoidable.  
The GHI and beyond: Coherence and historiographic narratives: Complex 
historiographic hypotheses (often presented in narrative form) are always 
underdetermined by the available evidence—there is no way to "prove" the LHI—
but the need for coherence of narratives can force modifications in them and even 
lead to the abandonment of a widely believed and strongly evocative hypotheses. 
And the more diverse and consilient the evidence, the tighter will these constraints 
be.  
4. Kuhnian considerations 
When the consensus opinion began to regard the books of Joshua and Judges as 
ahistorical (A11), it became fashionable to describe this change of consensus as a 
Kuhnian paradigmatic shift (Herzog 2000, Broshi 2008). Viewed in this light, all the 
attempts to resolve "the embarrassment of Ai" constituted just one more example of 
how defenders of a paradigm "devise numerous articulations and ad hoc 
modifications in their theory in order to eliminate the apparent conflict" when faced 
with an anomaly (Kuhn 1970:78). 
In Wallach 2019a I examines the role of coherence in determining the evolution and 
the fate of historiographic narratives, again stressing the importance of dynamic 
maintenance of coherence over the long term.   
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The change was indeed profound. It altered not only the understanding of the 
Bronze-Iron transition in Palestine, but also the span of possible scenarios for the 
emergence of the territorial monarchies of Judea and Israel, for the origin of the 
Jahvist religion, and much more. In a sense, it transformed the study of the period 
between the thirteenth and the tenth centuries in Palestine to something akin to the 
study of prehistory, because the biblical texts about these periods are now viewed as 
legendary, and other written sources do not exist.  
Nevertheless, I claim that the Kuhnian concept of "paradigm shift" or "scientific 
revolution" does not capture this change of consensus. It deviates from what 
happened in three significant aspects: 
- There was no incommensurability: In the case of the Ai excavations and 
elsewhere, the theoretical concepts—ages and periods, strata and phases, 
pottery types and inhabitation periods—were similarly construed by the 
scholars involved. So were also the historiographic questions that were 
addressed: the origins of the Philistines and the Israelites and the time of their 
appearance in Palestine, the organization and patterns of living in various sites, 
etc.  Arguments and disagreements abounded, of course, and sometimes basic 
elements of the working terminology were argued upon and altered.49 But there 
was no situation of scholars talking past each other or failing to comprehend 
what their predecessors had meant. Had it been otherwise, neither the shock 
created by Marquet-Krause results nor the rapid acceptance of the LCI and the 
LHI would have been possible. Nor could Callaway eliminate the alternatives to 
the Ai site offered in the preceding century, or Finkelstein argue against 
Callaway's hypothesis (A10) on the basis of Marquet-Krause's drawings and 
notes.  
This situation may be common. Putnam (1981: 117) maintains that as long as people 
share the same concept of an entity, they can communicate even if their conceptions 
of it are different. Buchwald and Smith (2001) offer a pragmatic test: If empirical 
                                                           
49  For example, the chronological division of the Iron Age, which was inspired by Albright and used 
(by Marquet-Krause and others) until the 1960s was revised by Aharoni and Amiran (1958) and again 
later.  
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evidence derived with the help of one hypothesis is part of the justification for 
another one (as were, for example, classical computations used to compare the 
measured value of Mercury's perihelion to relativistic predictions), then the two 
hypotheses are, ipso facto, commensurable. The iterative, scaffolding-on-scaffolding 
aspect of archaeological knowledge (B1) makes this beautifully apparent.  
- The process of consensus change was lengthy and gradual rather than a gestalt-
like transformation as described by Kuhn (1970: 77-91). Initially, a series of 
hypotheses (Albright 1934; Phythian-Adams 1936; Vincent 1937; Dussaud 1937; 
Yadin 1965) modified the conquest scenario while retaining its core assumptions. 
These hypotheses could, indeed, point to archaeological results that appeared to 
support them (A11). Only later, as more and more findings that could not fit well 
into the scenario were piling up from excavations and wide-area surveys, was the 
Conquest hypothesis abandoned and replaced with the peaceful immigration 
one. Similarly, the recognition that the material culture of the "Israelite" 
settlements is of local, indigenous nature and cannot support either a conquest 
nor an immigration scenario evolved gradually, passing through several interim 
hypotheses. (Amiran 1963: 233-344; Fritz 1987; Finkelstein and Na'aman 1994; 
Finkelstein 1998;  Dever 2003).   
- Undeniably, progress has been made:  For Kuhn, scientific progress is 
something that happens only within the normal, puzzle-solving phases. In 
scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts, however, progress is illusory: 
"Revolutions close with a total victory for one of the two opposing camps. 
Will that group ever say that the result of its victory has been something less 
than progress?" (ibid) 
Concerning the LCI, Even the "revisionist" (A12 and B7) accept that the accuracy and 
consistency of chronological determination today is superior to what had been in 
Marquet-Krause's time and certainly before that.  Most other scholars will agree that 
current historiographic understanding of the Bronze / Iron transition is substantially 
superior to that of Albright's (not to speak of Robinson's) days.  
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It is easy to conclude from the above that even though this change of consensus was
quite profound, it was not a "real paradigm shift."
Adams and Adams, however, think that the problem is deeper, and relates to all
sciences of the past. Commenting on Kuhn's idea of the sovereignty of paradigms
over observations, they say (1991:321):
If Kuhn were right about cosmological paradigms there should be no such
thing as the history of the world, and consequently no unique historical or
prehistoric record for the archaeologist to reconstruct. But again the
typological example makes this doubtful… the provenience-dates that are
indicated by the potsherd data are not artifacts of the typology; they are
extrinsic to it.
This argument of Adams & Adams was criticized by Wylie (1992: 490) as too light
and insufficient to repel the claim of post-processualist archaeologists (echoing
Kuhn) that data and observations are themselves not autonomous of expectations. I
think, however, that this critique misses the point: It is exactly the ability to
(sometimes) derive coherent and stable results out of admittedly loaded
observations that challenges the relativistic worldview. I shall return to this topic in
the last section (B8).
Finally, a historical side-note: Planck's maxim (cited in Kuhn 1970:151) that "a new
scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see
the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation
grows up that is familiar with it" may, if you wish, be applied to the first change of
consensus (from the Conquest to the Immigration hypothesis) but not to the second
one (from the Conquest to the Autochthonic one). The latter occured within a single
generation and largely by the same scholars.
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5. Inference from absence 
"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," wrote Carl Sagan50 (Sagan and 
Druyan 1997: 213) creating one of the best-known maxims used in scientific and 
philosophical argumentation. The aphorism is recent, but the concept of "we have 
not seen is no proof" is venerable (e.g., Lock 1690).  
And yet, in the archeological researches at Et-Tell, inference from absence was 
nonchalantly made and incontestably accepted, not once but three times: once by 
Albright to conclude that the site was not inhabited during the Late Bronze Age (A3), 
then by Marquet-Krause do derive the LCI (and from it, the LHI, A6), and finally by 
Callaway to affirm Marquet-Krause's results and to eliminate all "Ai alternatives" 
(A10).  
Not only that, but archeologist are sometimes prepared to infer from paucity, 
treating a small number of certain artifacts at a particular locality as lack thereof. 
This is why  Garstang's claim that he found a single Cypriote wish-bone handle at Et-
Tell (A3) and Yeivin belated memory of having seen some Late Bronze vessels (A6 
n16) did not receive much attention: Even if true, they could well have resulted from 
random post-depositional activities and therefore are inconsequential for 
determining the time of occupation of the site.   
This situation is quite unique: Inference from absence in the sciences is rare, and 
another group of examples cited in Ch. 4 demonstrates that when raised, it is usually 
considered inconsequential or outright false. In the historical sciences in particular, 
the lack of evidence is cited (Turner 2007, see also B8) as an argument for pessimism 
                                                           
50 Quoting the British astronomer Martin Rees. 
In Wallach 2019b I cite many examples that show that the use of inference from 
absence (IfA) is common and widespread in archaeology. Archaeologists often 
accept arguments based on the absence of evidence as comparable to arguments 
from evidence: fallible and defeasible, of course, but having a respectable 
plausibility. Quite a few TPA and TPQ (date before or after which something 
happened or existed) determinations are based on such inferences.  
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about our ability to know the past. Probabilistic models by Sober (2009) and McGrew 
(2014) regarding IfA in Palaeontology and Historiography, respectively, demonstrate 
that even though IfA is not literally false (because, logically, if evidence supports a 
hypothesis then its absence supports the hypothesis' negation), it is usually very 
weak. IfA in archaeology, to the best of my knowledge, has never been analyzed.51 
 The discrepancy between archaeology and other sciences can be resolved once we 
note that absence of evidence is evidence of absence, and potentially a very strong 
one if the evidence is strongly expected. The stronger our credence that evidence for 
something exists and can be found, the greater our surprise when (after a well-
conducted search) it is not found and our justification to draw conclusions from its 
absence. If the dog always barks at strangers and was not heard barking, then the 
intruder must have been a non-stranger.  
 In an orderly archaeological excavation, the likelihood of finding traces in a site that 
was sedentarily inhabited for an appreciable period is very high. That is because 
human beings, since early prehistory, are avid producers and discarders of artifacts 
wherever they are. These artifacts are usually distinguishable from their natural 
environments, and many of them have good survivability over the time scale of 
interest to archaeologists (think ceramic sherds). A prolonged sedentary inhabitation 
should, therefore, result in many identifiable traces in the site. And because 
excavation is a (locally) very intensive search, the likelihood of finding none (or just a 
few) of these traces, assuming the site was inhabited in the relevant period, is 
negligible.  
This simple consideration (See chapter 4 for a more detailed and rigorous treatment, 
including a probabilistic model) warrants the widespread use of IfA in archaeology. 
One notes that this state of affairs is intimately connected to archaeology being a 
science that researches the human past, and it is difficult to create in other 
disciplines.  
                                                           
51 Currie (2018, Ch. 5) is more optimistic about our ability to overcome the problems posed by the 
"gappiness" and "faintess" of the traces record, but he does not discuss archaeology per se.  
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Before closing this short exposition, several caveats need to be mentioned: 
- First, excavations of sedentary sites are, of course, an important part of 
archaeological research. However, other methods of archaeological research 
exist in which the above argumentation does not apply or is weaker. In 
particular, an over-the-surface field survey can miss evidence, which might 
have contributed to Albright's mistake when he combed the surface of Et-Tell 
with his students (A3, A9 #n29). In other circumstances (such as the search 
for settlements of nomads) IfA can be entirely misleading. 
- Second, excavations are local. Strictly speaking, inference from an 
excavation—either from evidence or from absence thereof – is similarly local. 
Generalizing from a partial excavation to the whole site is an additional 
inference, which needs to be justified on its own, taking the context into 
account. Garstang's conjecture (A8) that the biblical city might lie outside the 
area of Marquet-Krause's excavation was not vindicated, but only Callaway's 
excavation (A10) put it to rest by expanding the excavated site.  
- Third, even under the best circumstances, inference from absence is just one 
kind of empirical, inductive inference, and as such fallible and defeasible. But 
unlike in most other scientific circumstances, the onus of arguing for and 
against an archaeological IfA is more symmetrically divided. For example, 
Garstang's (A8) and Livingstone's (A12) suggestions that the absence of traces 
is due to their complete post-depositional removal by human or natural 
activities require pointing to circumstances (possible, but rather rare) that 
have enabled such a removal (which they did not do).   
6. Why was "the great embarrassment" allowed?  
Current theories in the sociology of science (Barnes and Bloor 1982; Bloor 1991) 
ascribe to social and ideological factors a major role (and in some versions, an 
exclusive role) in shaping scientific opinions. From this perspective, one would 
expect, at the very least, that the LCI and certainly the LHI would be met with deep 
suspicion and trenchant criticism. As already noted (A8), these inferences challenged 
not only the dominant historiographic hypotheses but also deeply entrenched 
ideologies and emotions. For Jewish scholars, from Marquet-Krause and Yeivin to 
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Klein and Yadin, the story of Ai was part of the national lore that inspired a modern 
revival. Many non-Jewish archaeologists, from Pythian-Adams, Vincent and Albright 
to Callaway, were devout believers, mostly graduates of denominational institutions 
and often ordained priests. Numerous references cited above show how disturbing 
were these inferences to most of them.  
However, Market-Krause's results—both the LCI and the LHI—were quickly and 
unanimously52 accepted as veridical (A8, A9). How can this be reconciled with a point 
of view which maintains that "Scientific theories, methods, and acceptable results 
are social conventions" (Bloor 1991:43)?   
My answer, admittedly old-fashion, is that scholars' commitment to epistemic values 
denied them the option of rejecting or disregarding a result that was entirely 
plausible when evaluated by these norms.   
As Tucker (2004: 42) states: 
  Legitimate historiography is marked by the precedence of critical cognitive 
values over other values, not by the absence of other values that generate 
different historiographic interpretations. Indeed, the presence of values in 
historiographic interpretation is inevitable (Berlin, 1969).  As long as the 
hierarchical precedence of cognitive to other values is preserved, legitimate 
historiography can accommodate myriad different and conflicting values and 
ensuing interpretations… Once we understand the hierarchy that gives 
precedence to consensus-generating cognitive values over other values that 
divide the historiographic community, it becomes clear that value-laden 
historiographic interpretation is inevitable, but hierarchically inferior to its 
scientific core according to cognitive values.  
Axiological considerations, therefore, can explain how people accept scientific 
inferences that go against their prior beliefs and interests. Tucker does not offer a 
list of appropriate cognitive values, and neither will I. But high on any such a list, I 
                                                           
52 The passionate protest of a certain Mr. Edward and the evasive reaction of Garstang during the 
1936 meeting of the Palestine Exploration Fund (A8) are exceptions that underline the rule.  
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think, would be the prioritizing of coherence in crafting and assessing explanations 
(B3). The LCI, with its centuries-long gap between the postulated biblical event and 
archaeological chronology, could not be negated without losing coherence with the 
thick topological and chronological knowledge base, not only of Palestine but of the 
whole Levant. And once the biblical geographical and topographical information was 
combined with the requirement that any eligible Ai site should present relevant 
material remains (B5), the LHI followed from the LCI, as Albright immediately 
understood and Callaway later verified.  
I do not mean to portray archaeology, or science in general, idealistically. Scientists' 
biases, convictions, and non-epistemic values influence their judgments, sometimes 
strongly so, and the case discussed here is no exception.  The complete refusal of the 
archaeological community (until the early 1950s) to consider the Alt-Noth "nihilist" 
theory as a possible explanation (A9) is an example, as is Albright's rejection of 
Starkey's dating of Canaanite Lachish (B2).  
 I do claim, however, that as long as scholars give precedence to epistemic values 
such as coherence and explanatory scope they are bound, at the very least, to 
modify their hypotheses and constrain the gamut of possible modifications. As 
additional data became available, the same set of values made rejection of the GHI 
untenable to most scholars, regardless of their religious or political sentiments.  
For what happens when epistemic values are secondary, see the next section.  
7. Knowledge and values 
A shared body of knowledge is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
scientific consensus. Grintz and Elitzur, Bimston and Livingston—all well-versed in 
the historical texts and the modern scientific literature—eject the current consensus 
As long as the case of Et-Tell appeared to be a more-or-less isolated one, it was still 
rationally possible to reject the GHI  by modifying the conquest hypothesis. This, 
however, became less and less plausible as contravening evidence accumulated 
(A11). When, in the 1970s, this hypothesis came to be viewed as entirely 
discredited, the relevant epistemic community was still composed mainly of 
religious Christians and Zionist jews.  
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opinion, both in its early and local form (the LHI) and in its later global form (the
GHI).53
These scholars offer alternative hypotheses under which both the LHI and the GHI
are unwarranted. Both hypotheses (A12) include a revised chronology for the
ancient Levant and novel suggestions for the location of biblical Ai. In other aspects
they differ,54 but the similarities are substantial enough that I allow myself to group
them under one term: the revisionist thinkers, or simply the revisionists.
Critical evaluation of established theories is essential to scientific discourse, and in
this respect such voices should be welcomed. If a widespread and heterogeneous
consensus is an indication of knowledge (Tucker 2004), then challenging an
established consensus and putting it to the test may pave the way to another and
better-established consensus and, arguably, to better knowledge. There is a caveat,
though: A challenge can ameliorate knowledge only if epistemic values are
hierarchically superior to other values. Judging what qualifies as "better" knowledge
is problematic enough when values are shared, but it is hopeless when they are not.
I posit that the fact that the revisionist scholars maintain an array of hypotheses
that diverge from the current consensus is wholly explicable by the fact that they
hold other values—to wit, adherence to the literal or quasi-literal veridicality of the
biblical record - as superior to epistemic values.
This hierarchy is explicit in their writings. Elitzur simply says that "According to the
common position among Bible scholars, the Exodus and Conquest actually took place
nearly 200 years later … However, this position is inconsistent with the Biblical text"
(2014, n4). Livingston asserts that "Whatever the outcome, we maintain that the
Bible is truth, and that archaeology is too fragmentary to piece together the whole
truth. When archaeology and the Bible seem not to say the same thing, our
53 One thing that they did not challenge or attempt to revised is the LCI (that Et-Tell was inhabited
during the Middle and Late Bronze age), and the methodology of dating by ceramic typology, on
which it was based. Livingston (2003) also makes extensive use of conventional ceramic typology.
54 One difference is that unlike Grinz and Elitzur, who merely say that ancient Ai "must be somewhere
there", Bimson and Livingston offer a concrete alternative and support it with additional auxiliary
hypotheses about, e.g., the correct interpretation of Eusebius' text and the Byzantine practices for
measurement of intercity distances.
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approach is to seek to reconcile them and not to quit until we have." Recalcitrant
data, in other words, can never challenge the hypothesis, only the other way around.
That the revisionist hypotheses are loaded with inconsistencies was amply
demonstrated by Halpern (1987), Bietak (1988), Rainy (1980, 1988), and others.55
Rather than repeating  their arguments, let me add a few of my own:
- Concerning the Grintz/Elitzur hypothesis, one notes that if we accept (as
Grintz convincingly demonstrated) that the toponym "Ai" was not unique but
was used elsewhere in ancient Palestine, there is not much support for
assuming that the locations of biblical places with similar names (the
monarchic " Aiyah " and " Aiyath") or even the same name in later periods
(the post-exilic "Ai) were identical with Joshua's Ai. But if they were not, then
Grintz' argument from chronology is a non sequitur.
- Concerning Livingston's report of his Khirbet-Nysia excavations, one notes
that even if these results are accurate, there is nothing in them to compel
identification of Khirbet Nysia with ancient Ai. The claim that the site is a
possible Ai-candidate depends crucially on the identification of El-Bireh with
ancient Bethel which is, under the most graceful interpretation, very
speculative.
- Both Elitzur (2014: 29-30) and Livingston (1970: 27) rely on Josh. 10:2 56 to
claim that the biblical Ai should have been smaller than Gibeon of the same
era. Since the assumed site of Gibeon (at current Al-Jib, an identification
which they accept) is a small one,57 this should prove that Et-Tell does not
qualify. This argument is an obvious Petitio Principii, a perfect example of
vicious circularity (B2), in a context where the reliability of the biblical source
55 These articles were written as rebuttals of Bimson and Livingston, but the first two discuss the
chronology of the Levant and are therefore a rebuttal of the Grintz/Elitzur version as well. Zevit
(1983) criticizes the Grintz/Elitzur rejection of Et-Tell as the site of Ai.
56 "He and his people were much alarmed, because Gibeon was a great city, as one of the royal cities,
and because it was greater than Ai, and all the men thereof were mighty."
57 In fact it was negligible during the Middle Bronze Age and virtually non-existent in the Late Bronze
(Pritchard 1993).
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is itself in question. It is also inconsistent with the biblical texts themselves 
(Josh. 8:25 mentions 12,000 inhabitants in Ai)  
Advocating relativism about knowledge, Barnes and Bloor (1982) assert that  
Our equivalence postulate is that all beliefs are on a par with one another 
with respect to the causes of their credibility… For the relativist there is no 
sense in the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational as distinct 
from merely locally accepted as such.  
Similar opinions were expressed by several archaeologists: 
Individuals, interest groups, and societies all have different perspectives on 
the past. There is and can be no monolithic, undifferentiated PAST. Rather, 
there are multiple and competing pasts made in accordance with ethnic, 
cultural and gender political expectations (Shanks and Tilley 1987: 11). 
In the case discussed here, all scholars involved held much the same ethnic, cultural 
(and, who knows, maybe also gender political) expectations, but most of them 
The preponderance of the non-epistemic value of biblical veracity in the revisionist's 
stance is also apparent in their light-handed dismissal of inference from absence, 
even when backed by repeated conscientious searches in a confined locality (cf. (B5). 
Aware that Callaway's excavations exhausted all geographically plausible alternatives 
for the location of biblical Ai, Elitzur writes: "It is likely that the ruins of Ai can simply 
be found in a section of Et-Tell that has not yet been excavated, perhaps buried 
beneath part of the adjacent town of Deir Dibwan. It is critical to stress that the mere
 lack of archaeological evidence for this claim is no proof of its illegitimacy." 
Livingston downplays his failure to discover any evidence 
for construction, fortifications or a destruction layer (2003: 29-30) at his proposed Ai 
site of Khirbet Nysia by postulating a total obliteration by "later building and 
agricultural activities" (2003: 15). Building and agricultural activities are indeed part 
of the history of many archaeological sites in Palestine, but only under special 
circumstances—which Livingston does not cite—can they result in complete removal 
of all relevant traces. 
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nevertheless allowed their perspectives of the past to be checked and modified by
empirical results, while some did not.
The comparison between the two approaches shows the poverty of relativistic
thinking. Not all beliefs are similarly explained. The difference in the way the
revisionists and other scholars handle the same information can only be explained by
attributing different causes to beliefs: prioritizing religious belief on the one side and
commitment—partial and mitigated to be sure, but nevertheless hierarchically
superior—to cognitive and epistemic values on the other.
Viewed in this light, the humble mound of Et-Tell / Ai serves as a foil to the
relativistic tenet no less than to the content of two biblical chapters.
8. Ground truths
Throughout the second division of this treatise, I referred to typology (and, by
extension, to archaeology in general) as knowledge-generating. But knowledge
assumes truth; even critics of the TJB construal of knowledge accept that false
propositions cannot be known (Ichikawa and Steup 2018).
The idea that science can discover truths has received a lot of bad press. A
watershed was Kuhn's critique, epitomized in (1970: 170-6):
We may, to be more precise, have to relinquish the notion, explicit or
implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from
them closer and closer to the truth. … Perhaps there is some other way of
salvaging the notion of ‘truth’ for application to whole theories, but this one
will not do. There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct
phrases like ‘really there’; the notion of a match between the ontology of a
theory and its “real” counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in
principle.
A separate worry is epistemic: Even assuming metaphysical truth, can we get to
know it? Chang (2004: 46) contends that:
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There are very few actual cases in which we could be confident that we are
approaching ‘‘the truth’’ by epistemic iteration. Other objectives are easier to
achieve, and the degree of their achievement is easier to assess. 58
Sciences that seek to reconstruct the past are subject to a particular type of
pessimism about their ability to point to truths. The separation of the researchers
from their subject-matter (since only traces are available) and the impossibility of
repeatable experiments are often cited as impediments to the truth-conduciveness
of these sciences. Where the human past is concerned, other difficulties arise. The
most salient ones are the inaccessibility of the agents' inner world on the one hand,
and the always-present burden of the researchers' culture and values on the other.
Considering these issues, many thinkers came to conclude that the concept of truth
is irrelevant for reconstructions of the human past.
I think this is wrong, and the case of Ai/Et-Tell can serve as a rebuttal.  Specifically, I
am going to claim that in many (though by no means all) questions about the human
past the choice between hypotheses can be not only rational but also amenable to a
truth-bearing judgment.
My argument focuses on the LCI (the inference that the mound of Et-Tell was
inhabited during the Late Bronze Age and again during the Early Iron Age, but not
during the intermediate period). For my contention, as stated above, the LCI suffices
because it was non-obvious, contradicted commonly held beliefs, had important
implications, and is generally and stably accepted since its first pronouncement in
the mid-1930s (A8, B1). It has the advantage of being simple enough to allow an
excluded-middle type of argument: either there was a sedentary inhabitation on the
site during a particular period, or there was not. The fine-grained details—just what
kind of settlement, for how long—matter a lot for the historical reconstruction, but
not for the essence of the inference or for the impact that it created, and I shall
ignore them here.
58 In a more recent article Chang (2018: 33) proposes "a pragmatist coherence theory of truth,
according to which a statement is true if (belief in) it is needed in a coherent epistemic activity… a
matter of degree and circumstances." As far as I can see, this construal of truth retains his former
reservations.
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As the former discussion should have made plain, there was and is not any coherent
or even just consistent (B3) way to negate the LCI—to argue, for example that a
town stood at the mound during the fifteenth century B.C.—while at the same time
retaining the accepted chronology of the ancient Levant. And this chronology, in a
much finer resolution than necessary for the LCI, is corroborated by literarily millions
of pieces of evidence – inscriptions and papyri, sites and strata, sherds and other
artifacts – from all over the Middle East as well as from the Aegean and Nilotic
realms. Modifying this corpus of data to an extent sufficient to challenge the LCI is
implausible, and denying its validity altogether calls for an extreme Cartesian-Demon
type of skepticism against any human knowledge. Unless one adopts such a skeptic
stance, one is bound to consider the LCI as a true statement about the past.
Contrary to Kuhn's assertion cited at the beginning of this section, then, I claim that
the Late-Bronze Age city at Et-Tell was really there, and the same is true for the Iron
Age settlement and the intermediate gap of sedentary habitation.
It is important to stress that even though coherence plays a central role in my
argument, it is not predicated on a coherence theory of truth, or even on a
coherentist theory of justification (which has gone out of favor in recent decades,
BonJour 1999; Schubert and Olsson 2013; Olsson 2017). Rather, it rests on the
commonsensical premises that (a) a patently incoherent set of beliefs cannot be
truth-conducive (a claim that both fundamentalist and coherentist usually accept)
and (b) somethingmust be true about the occupancy of the mound at any time of
the past. The truth of the LCI then follows from the assertion, defended in length in
the previous sections, that the prolonged and iterative process of archaeological
research resulted in a coherent and robust system of chronological determination
(certainly to the extent of temporal resolution required in this case) of which the LCI
is the only plausible result. It is, in a sense, an eliminative argument rather than a
coherentist one.
If this is correct, then the ability to derive such an unexpected true result through a
scientific investigation speaks also against Chang's deep epistemic pessimism.
It is telling that even those who were strongly motivated to object to the LHI or the
GHI, from Garstang and Phythian-Adams in the 1930s to Elitzur and Livingston in the
82
2000s (A12, B7), have found the LCI unassailable. In this respect, the case of Et-
Tell/Ai and in particular the LCI is a fine example of Laudan and Leplin's (1991) thesis
that empirical equivalence and contrastive59 underdetermination between theories
are not inevitable, because it may be practically impossible to formulate a plausible
alternative to a hypothesis that has broad epistemic support.
Looking at the other inferences discussed above, one observes that the LHI follows
from the LCI given few simple and widely accepted auxiliary premises (B0): that all
alternatives to the location of the biblical Ai offered so far suffer from grave problems
of coherence and consistency, while the LHI itself coheres well with other evidence-
based inferences about the Bronze-Iron transition in Palestine. It is extremely likely,
therefore, to be true. The case of the GHI is much more complicated: Perhaps an
argument similar to the one given here can support a claim for the falsity of the
Conquest and the Immigration hypotheses. It does not follow from this, however,
that the currently believed Autochthonic scenario is true, because other as-yet-
unforeseen alternatives may be possible.
As emphasized above (cf. the last three paragraph of B1), not all questions about the
human past are amenable to truth-bearing resolution. Many, maybe most, are not.
But inasmuch as some are, this can be construed as in-principle support for the ability
of science to discover substantive mind-independent truths, surprisingly drawn from
what is arguably the most special of the special sciences.
Conclusion
This treatise is comprised of two divisions. Each one, I believe, has merit in its own
right, but they are meant to be mutually supporting.
The first covers the history of a scientific topic: the whereabouts, identity, and fate
of a biblical city. If this part is somewhat lengthy (it is certainly longer than what I
59 As distinct from holist (Duhem-Quine) underdetermination, which arises from the impossibility to
test a hypothesis in isolation from other ones. Laudan and Leplin do not make this distinction
between types of indetermination, but it is convincingly made in Stanford (2017).
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envisioned when I began this work!) it is because I tried to "give a voice" to the many
scholars that were involved and to their beliefs and deliberations.
In the second division, the historical scenario from the first one is used as a template
for the analysis of several issues related to the epistemology of the past. In sections
B1 and B2, I showed that the iterative process that underlines archeological research
can lead to stable and well-substantiated knowledge while minimizing the risk of
vicious circularity. Section B3 stresses the central role of the consilience of evidence
combined with the coherence of explanation in evaluating hypotheses about the
past. Section B4 highlights the inadequacy of the Kuhnian framework for the
description and understanding of substantial changes in our beliefs about the past.
Section B5 clarifies the unique role of inference from absence in archaeology. In
sections B6 and B7 I build on the convoluted history of The "Ai-debates" to
demonstrate that, contrary to prevailing relativistic theories of knowledge, scientists
can and do arrive at conclusions contrary to their former entrenched beliefs and
ideologies, but only if their values prioritizes epistemic values over other ones. In
section B8 I argue that evidence-based inferences about the past can (sometimes)
point to mind-independent truths.
Presentism and Whiggism: Studies that use historical episodes as a resource for
evaluation of general issues encounter several critiques that deserve to be
mentioned here:
Presentism is the study of the past from the vantage point of the present, something
that is judged negatively by historiographers (see for example Hunt, 2002).
Nevertheless, many scholars of history and philosophy of science have come to see
that it is merely an inevitable part of their work (Chang, 2009), and that "taken
seriously, such a ban on presentism would appear to preclude not merely the
These sections are meant to be self-contained, but there are also mutually linked.  
They draw a lot, needless to say, frommany works by numerous scholars about the 
epistemology of archaeology and thesciences of the past generally. For my
interpretations, observations, and conclusionsI am alone, of course, responsible.
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narration of scientific progress, but all treatment of transitions in the sciences"
(Jardine, 2003).
Jardine (2000) and Tosh (2003) argued that a present-centered, retrospective
analysis of past scientific works is inevitable and, when properly done, legitimate. In
any case, the scientific categories that were relevant here, such as "site," "layer,"
and, especially, the conceptual framework of archaeological eras (Bronze and Iron
Ages and their sub-divisions) were retained, slightly refined but not fundamentally
modified, throughout and beyond the period discussed here. Therefore, the
question of presentism or anachronism is of little import here.
"Whiggism"60 and "triumphalism" are terms that are sometimes used
interchangeably to denote (and denounce) looking at the past as inevitably leading
to the present beliefs, accentuating the role of the "winners." Chang (2009),
however, defines them as conceptual antipodes: Whiggism involves judging past
scientific theories according to our modern standards, while triumphalism continues
to celebrate what was once victorious in the past. I avoid both traps by following the
dynamics of scientific opinions through time, referring at each point to the
knowledge available then. The largest share of this treatise focuses on the eventual
"losers" and shows why their epistemic stances were rational given the evidence
they had.
I posit, therefore, that the approach taken here is sound and valid, and the analysis
and conclusions in this case study deserve to be judged and evaluated on their own
merits.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Yemima Ben-Menahem and Yosef Garfinkel for their valuable
comments on an earlier version of this article.
60 Originally coined in the context of British political historiography (Butterfield 1931).
Bibliography
85
Adams, W. Y., and Adams, E. W. (1991). Archaeological typology and
practical reality: a dialectical approach to artifact classification and sorting.
Cambridge University Press.
Adams, W. Y., Abel, L. J., Arnold, D. E., Chittick, N., Davis, W. M., De
Maret, P., ... and Simmons, M. P. (1979). On the Argument from Ceramics to
History: A Challenge Based on Evidence From Medieval Nubia [and
Comments and Reply]. Current Anthropology, 20(4), 727-744.
Aharoni, Y., and Amiran, R. (1958). A new scheme for the sub-division of the
Iron Age in Palestine. Israel Exploration Journal, 8(3), 171-184.
Albright, W. F. (1921). A revision of early Hebrew chronology. The Journal of
the Palestine oriental society, 1, 4-79.
- (1924). Excavations and results at Tell el-Ful (Gibeah of Saul). The Annual
of the American Schools of Oriental Research, 4, 1-160.
- (1929a). The American Excavations at Tell Beit Mirsim. Zeitschrift für die
alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 47(1), 1-17.
- . (1929b). Progress in Palestinian Archaeology during the year 1928.
Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, 1-10.
- (1934). The Kyle memorial excavation at Bethel. Bulletin of the American
Schools of Oriental Research, (56), 2-1.
- (1935). Archaeology and the Date of the Hebrew Conquest of Palestine.
Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, (58), 10-18.
- (1939). The Israelite conquest of Canaan in the light of archaeology.
Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, (74), 11-23.
- (1956). Albrecht Alt. Journal of Biblical Literature, 74(3), 169-173.
Amiran, R (1963). The ancient pottery of the holy land: From its beginning in
the Neolithic period to the end of the Iron Age. The Bialik Institute and the
Israel Exploration Society. (In Hebrew).
86
- (1970) The Egyptian Alabaster Vessels from Ai, Israel Exploration
Journal, (20), 170-179.
Barag, D. (1993). The first "Zabré" archaeologist. Kadmoniot,112(2), 118-9.
(In Hebrew)
Barnes, B., and Bloor, D. (1982). Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of
knowledge. In Hollis, M., and Lukes, S. (eds). Rationality and relativism. pp.
31-47. The MIT Press.
Bietak, M. (1988). Contra Bimson, Late Bronze Age cannot begin as late as
1400 B.C. Biblical Archaeological Review, 14(4), 54-5.
Bimson, J. J., and Livingston, D. (1987). Redating the Exodus. Biblical
Archaeology Review, 13(5), 40-53.
Biran, A. and Nave, J. (1995). The Tel Dan Inscription: A New Fragment.
Israel Exploration Journal, 45(1), 1-18.
Bloor, D. (1991). Knowledge and social imagery. University of Chicago Press.
BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press.
- (1999), “The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism,” in J. Greco
and E. Sosa (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Broshi, M. (2008). The Israeli archaeology: Real biases and imagined biases.
In: M. Feige and Z. Shiloni (eds.) An ax to grind with: archaeology and
nationality in Eretz-Israel. Ben-Gurion University Press. pp. 19-42 (In
Hebrew).
Buchwald, J. Z. and Smith, G. E. (2001). Incommensurability and the
discontinuity of evidence. Perspectives on Science, 9(4), 463-498.
Butterfield, H. (1965). The Whig interpretation of history. (London, 1931).
Google Scholar, 12.
87
Callaway, J. A. (1968). New Evidence on the Conquest of Ai. Journal of
Biblical Literature, 312-320.
- (1969). The significance of the Iron-Age village at Ai (Et-Tell).
Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies, 1, 56-61.
- (1976). Excavating Ai (et-Tell): 1964-1972. The Biblical Archaeologist,
18-30.
- (1985). Was My Excavation of Ai Worthwhile? Biblical Archaeology
Review, 11(2), 68-69.
- (1992). Ai. In: D. N. Freedman (Ed.) The Anchor Bible Dictionary,
Doubleday, Vol 1, 125-130.
- (1993). Ai. In: E. Stern (ed.) The new encyclopedia of archaeological
excavations in the holy land. The Israel Exploration Society and Carta. pp.
39-45.
Callaway, J. A., Power, W. J. A., Bull, R. J., and Schoonover, K. (1965). The
1964 'Ai (Et-Tell) Excavations. Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental
Research, 178, 13-40.
Callaway, J. A., and Nicol, M. B. (1966). A Sounding at Khirbet Ḥaiyân.
Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research. 183, 12-19.
Callaway, J. A., Harvey, D., Schoonover, K., Ward, J. M., Vine, K., and
Livingston, G. H. (1969). The 1966 'Ai (Et-Tell) Excavations. Bulletin of the
American Schools of Oriental Research, 196, 2-16.
Carroll, N. (2001). On the narrative connection. in S. Benjamin and W. van
Peer (Eds.) New perspectives on narrative perspective. Albany: State
University of New York Press. pp. 21-4.
Chang, H. (2004). Inventing Temperature: Measurement and scientific
progress. Oxford University Press.
- (2009). We Have Never Been Whiggish (About Phlogiston) 1. Centaurus,
51(4), 239-264.
88
- (2018). Realism for realistic people. Spontaneous generations: A journal
for the history and philosophy of science, 9(1), 31-34.
Chapman, R., and Wylie, A. (2016). Evidential reasoning in archaeology.
Bloomsbury Publishing.
Cleland, C. E. (2002). Methodological and epistemic differences between
historical science and experimental science. Philosophy of Science, 69(3), 447-
451.
- (2011). Prediction and explanation in the historical natural science. British
journal of the philosophy of science, 0: 1-32.
- (2013). Common cause explanation and the search for a smoking gun.
Geological Society of America Special Papers, 502, 1-9.
Conder, C. R. (1874). The Survey of Palestine. Palestine Exploration
Quarterly, 6(2), 35-64.
- (1881). On some of the gains to biblical archaeology due to the new
survey. Palestine Exploration Quarterly, 13(1), 34-56.
- (1887). Tent work in Palestine: a record of discovery and adventure (Vol.
2). Bentley.
Currie, A. (2016). Hot-Blooded Gluttons: Dependency, Coherence, and
Method in the Historical Sciences. The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 68(4), 929-952.
- (2017). Review of Evidential reasoning in archaeology by Chapman and
Wylie. Doi: 10.1086/693878
- (2018). Rock, Bone, and Ruin: An Optimist's Guide to the Historical
Sciences. The MIT Press. Kindle Edition.
Davis, T. W. (2004). Shifting sands: the rise and fall of Biblical archaeology.
Oxford University Press.
89
De Vaux, R., (1969). Critique of "Die Landnahme der israeliten Stämme in der
neuren wissenschaftlichen Discusion" par M. Weippert. Revue Biblique, 86,
272-276.
Dever, W. G. (1993). What remains of the house that Albright built? The
Biblical Archaeologist, 56(1), 25-35.
- (2003). Who were the early Israelites, and where did they come from? Wm.
B. Eerdmans Publishing.
- (2011). Recent archaeological discoveries and biblical research.
University of Washington Press.
Dunnell, R. C. (1986). Methodological issues in Americanist artifact
classification. Advances in archaeological method and theory, 9, 149-207.
Dussaud, R. (1935). Note additionnell, Syria, 16(4) 346-352.
- (1937). Le nom ancien de la ville de'Ay en Palestine. Revue de l'histoire
des religions, 125-141.
Elitzur, Y. (1980). The Arab village and the biblical geography. Teva Va'aretz,
22(6), 233-237. (in Hebrew).
- (2014). "Between Bethel and Ai" – Identifying Ai. Makom Baparasha. 19-
30. Yediot Aharonot publication. (In Hebrew; English translation by D.
Landman in: http://etzion.org.il/en/parashat-lekh-lekha-“between-bethel-
and-ai”-–-identifying-ai).
Finkelstein, I. (1998). The rise of early Israel: archaeology and long-term
history. In: S. Ahituv and E.D. Oren (Eds), The Origin of Early Israel–Current
Debate: Biblical, Historical and Archaeological Perspectives, Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev, pp. 7-39.
- (2007). Iron Age I Khirbet Et-Tell and Khirbet  Raddana: Methodological
Lessons. Up to the Gates of Ekron": Essays on the Archaeology and
History of the Eastern Mediterranean in Honor of Seymour Gitin.
Jerusalem, 107-113.
90
Finkelstein, I., and Naʼaman, N. (Eds.). (1994). From nomadism to monarchy:
archaeological and historical aspects of early Israel. Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi.
Finkelstein, I., and Silberman, N. A. (2002). The Bible Unearthed:
Archaeology's New Vision of Ancient Isreal and the Origin of Sacred Texts.
Simon and Schuster.
Forber, P., and  Griffith, E. (2011). Historical reconstruction: Gaining
epistemic access to the deep past. Philosophy and Theory in Biology, 3.
Fritz, V. (1987). Conquest or Settlement? The Early Iron Age in Palestine. The
Biblical Archaeologist, 50(2), 84-100.
Garstang, J. (1931). The foundations of Bible history: Joshua, Judges.
Constable and Company Limited.
Greenberg, R. (1987). New Light on the Early Iron Age at Tell Beit Mirsim.
Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, 55-80.
Grintz, J. M. (1947) "Ai which is with Beth-Aven." Sinai, 21, 219-228. (In
Hebrew).
- (1961). "'Ai which is beside Beth-Aven" A re-examination of the identity
of' Ai. Biblica, 42(2), 201-216.
Guérin, V. (1869). Description géographique, historique et archéologigue de
la Palestine; Tome troisième: Judée. L'Impremerie imperial.
Halpern, B. (1987). Radical Exodus Redating Fatally Flawed. Biblical
Archaeology Review, 13(6).
Harding, A. (1999). Establishing archaeological chronologies. In:  Barker, G.
(Ed.). Companion encyclopedia of archaeology. Routledge.
Herr, L. G. (2002). WF Albright and the history of pottery in Palestine. Near
Eastern Archaeology, 65(1), 51-55.
Herzog, Z. (2000): Archaeology, the Bible and the Israeli society. Al-Atar 7, 9-
16. (In Hebrew)
91
Hull, D. L. (1975). Central subjects and historical narratives. History and
theory, 14(3), 253-274.
Hunt, L. (2002). Against presentism. President’s column in Perspectives: The
magazine for the American Historical Association. Retrieved June, 16, 2008.
Ichikawa, J. J., and Steup, M. (2018).  The Analysis of Knowledge." In E. N.
Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition),
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-
analysis/>.
Jardine, N. (2000). Uses and abuses of anachronism in the history of the
sciences. History of science, 38, 251-270.
- (2003). Whigs and stories: Herbert Butterfield and the historiography of
science. History of science, 41(2), 125-140.
Jeffares, B. (2008). Testing times: regularities in the historical sciences. Studies
in history and philosophy of science part C: Studies in history and philosophy
of biological and biomedical sciences, 39(4), 469-475.
- (2010). Guessing the future of the past. Biology and Philosophy, 25(1),
125-142.
Kitchener, H. H. (through W. F. Birch) (1878). Ai. Palestine Exploration
Quarterly, 10(3), 132-133.
Kosso, P. (1989). Science and objectivity. The Journal of philosophy, 86(5),
245-257.
- (2001). Knowing the past: Philosophical issues of history and archaeology.
Humanity books.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd. Ed. University
of Chicago Press.
Kuukkanen, J-M. (2015). Postnarrativist philosophy of historiography.
Springer. Kindle edition.
92
Laudan, L., and  Leplin, J. (1991). Empirical equivalence and
underdetermination. The journal of philosophy, 88(9), 449-472.
Lederman, Z., (1999). An early iron age village at Khirbet Raddana: the
excavations of Joseph A. Callaway. Ph.D. thesis presented to Harvard
University.
Lewis, D. (1979). Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow. Noûs, 455-476.
Livingston, D. P. (1970). Location of Biblical Bethel and Ai Reconsidered.
Westminster Theological Seminary.
- (1989). Khirbet Nisya 1979-1986: a Report on Six Seasons of Excavation.
Dissertations. Andrews University.
- (1994). Further Considerations on the Location of Bethel at el-Bireh.
Palestine exploration quarterly, 126(2), 154-159.
- (2003). Khirbet Nisya: the search for biblical Ai 1979-2002: excavation of
the site with related studies in biblical archaeology. Associates for Biblical
Research.
Marquet-Krause J. (1934). La première campagne de fouilles a Ay (1933).
Rapport sommaire. (unpublished) In: Marquet-Krause, J., through Dussaud, R.
(1949). Les fouilles de'Ay (El-Tell), 1933-1935. Librairie Orientaliste Paul
Geuthner. pp. 7-12.
- (1935a). La deuxième campagne de fouilles a Ay (1934). Rapport
sommaire. Syria, 16(4) 325-345.
- (1935b). The recent excavations at Ai (Et-Tell). Yediot - Bulletin of the
Jewish Palestine Exploration Society, 3(3), 73-77. (In Hebrew).
- (1936). Troisième Campagne de fouilles a Ay (1935). Rapport sommaire.
(unpublished). In: Marquet-Krause, J., through  Dussaud, R. (1949). Les
fouilles de'Ay (El-Tell), 1933-1935. Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner.
pp. 29-34.
93
Marquet-Krause, J., through Dussaud, R. (1949). Les fouilles de'Ay (El-Tell),
1933-1935: la resurrection d'une grande cite biblique. Librairie Orientaliste
Paul Geuthner.
Marquet-Krause, J. and Yeivin, S. (1934). The excavations at Et-Tell. Yediot -
Bulletin of the Jewish Palestine Exploration Society, 1(4), 28-30. (In Hebrew)
- (1935). Et-Tell. The Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities in
Palestine, 4, 204-205. Oxford University Press.
Mazar, A. (1990). Archaeology of the Land of the Bible. The Anchor Bible
Reference Library. New York: Doubleday.
McGrew, T. (2014). The argument from silence. Acta Analytica, 29(2), 215-
228.
Moorey, P. R. S. (1991). A century of biblical archaeology. Westminster John
Knox Press.
Noth, M. (1935). Bethel und Ai. Palästinajahrbuch des Deutschen
evangelischen Instutut fürAltertumwissenschaft des heiligen Landes zu
Jerusalem, 31(7), 7-29.
- (1938a). Grundsätzliches zur geschichtlichen Deutung archäologischer
Befunde auf den Boden Palästinas. Palästinajahrbuch des Deutschen
evangelischen Instutut fürAltertumwissenschaft des heiligen Landes zu
Jerusalem, 34, 7-22.
- (1938b). Das Buch Josua. Verlag von J.C.B Mohr.
Olsson, E. (2017). Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification. In E. N.
Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition).
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/justep-coherence/>.
Orton, C., and Hughes, M. (2013). Pottery in archaeology. Cambridge
University Press.
Petrie, W. M. F. (1892). The story of a "Tell": A lecture delivered for the
Palestine Exploration Fund. Palestine Exploration Fund.
94
Phythian-Adams, W. J. (1936 ). Jericho, Ai and the Occupation of Mount
Ephraim. Palestine Exploration Quarterly, 68(3), 141-149.
Sagan, C. and Druyan, A. 1997. The demon-haunted world, Science as a candle
in the dark. New York: Random House.
Sober, E. (2009). Absence of evidence and evidence of absence, Evidential
transitivity in connection with fossils, fishing, fine-tuning, and firing squads.
Philosophical Studies, 143(1), 63-90.
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, truth, and history. Cambridge University Press.
Rainey, A. F. (1971). Bethel is still Beitin. Westminster Theological Journal.,
23(2).
- (1980). Redating the Exodus and Conquest (Journal for the Study of Old
Testament Supplement Series 5) By John Y Bimson. Israel Exploration
Journal, 30(3/4), 249-251.
- (1988). Letter to the editor: on the Location of Bethel and Ai. Biblical
Archaeological Review, 14(5), 67-8.
- (2006). Looking for Bethel: An Exercise in Historical Geography.
Confronting the Past: Archaeological and Historical Essays on Ancient
Israel in Honor of William G. Dever. pp. 269-273.
Robinson, E. (1856). Biblical Researches in Palestine and the Adjacent
Regions: A Journal of Travels in the Years 1838 and 1852, in three volumes.
Murray.
Salmon, M. H. (1993). Philosophy of archaeology: Current issues. Journal of
archaeological research, 1(4), 323-343.
Schubert, S. and Olsson, E. (2013). Coherence and Reliability in Judicial
Reasoning. In M. Araszkiewicz (Ed.) Coherence. Insights from Philosophy,
Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence. Springer.
95
Sellin, E. (1899 and 1890). Mitteilungen von meiner Palästinareise 1899.
Mitteilungen and Nachrichten des Deutschen Palästinaverein, 97-100 (1899);
1-4 (1990).
Shanks, M., and Tilley, C. Y. (1987). Re-constructing archaeology: theory and
practice. Psychology Press.
Shepard, A. O. (1956). Ceramics for the Archaeologist. Washington, DC:
Carnegie Institution of Washington.
Sober, E. (2009). Absence of evidence and evidence of absence: Evidential
transitivity in connection with fossils, fishing, fine-tuning, and firing squads.
Philosophical Studies, 143(1), 63-90.
Stanford, K. (2017). Underdetermination of Scientific Theory. In E. N. Zalta
(ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition). URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/scientific-
underdetermination/>.
Trigger, B. G. (2006). A History of Archaeological Thought. Second edition
Cambridge University Press.
Tucker, A. (2004). Our knowledge of the past: A philosophy of historiography.
Cambridge University Press.
Turner, D. (2005). Local underdetermination in historical science. Philosophy
of Science, 72(1), 209-230.
- (2007) Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism
Debate. Cambridge University Press.
Ussishkin, D. (1987). Lachish–Key to the Israelite Conquest of Canaan? Biblical
Archaeology Review, 13(1), 18-39.
Van De Velde, C. W. M. (1854). Narrative of a Journey through Syria and
Palestine in 1851 and 1852. W. Blackwood.
96
Vincent, L. H. (1937). Les fouilles d'Et–TellL='AÏ. Revue Biblique, 46(2), 231-
266.
Wallach, E. (2018). Bayesian representation of prolonged archaeological
debate. Synthese, 195(1), 401-431.
Wilson, C. W. (1869). On the Site of Ai and the Position of the Altar which
Abram Built between Bethel and Ai. Palestine Exploration Quarterly, 2(4), 123-
126.
Wright, E. G. (1936). The Chronology of Palestine in the Early Bronze Age.
Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, (64), 12-21.
- (1937). The pottery of Palestine from the earliest times to the end of the
Early Bronze Age. New Haven: American Schools of Oriental Research.
Wylie, A. (1992). A hierarchy of purposes: Typological theory and practice.
Current Anthropology, 33(4), 486-491.
- (1993). A proliferation of new archaeologies: “beyond objectivism and
relativism”. In N. Yoffe and N Sherratt (eds.) Archaeological theory: who
sets the agenda. Cambridge University Press. pp.  20-26.
- (2002). Thinking from Things: Essays in the philosophy of archaeology.
University of California Press.
Yadin, Y. (1965).Military and archaeological aspects of the conquest of
Canaan in the Book of Joshua. The Jewish Education Committee of New York
in cooperation with the World Jewish Bible Society and the Department for
Education and Culture of the Jewish Agency.
- (1982). Is the Biblical Account of the Israelite Conquest of Canaan
Historically Reliable? Biblical Archaeology Review, 8(2), 16-23.
- (2019a). Historiographic narratives and empirical evidence - a case  
                   study. Synthese, DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-02065-w.
- (2019b). Inference from absence: the case of archaeology. Palgrave
Communications, 5. 
97
Yeivin, S. (1937). The Exodus and the Conquest (current problems). In N. H.
Torczyner (Ed.) Klausner Festschrift. "Omanut" Publications, pp. 67-78.  (In
Hebrew).
- (1971). The Israelite conquest of Canaan. Uitgaven van het Nederlands
Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul.
Zevit, Z. (1983). Archaeological and Literary Stratigraphy in Joshua 7-8. Bulletin
of the American Schools of Oriental Research, (251), 23-35.
